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NO PLACE FOR SPEECH ZONES: HOW
COLLEGES ENGAGE IN EXPRESSIVE
GERRYMANDERING
A. Celia Howard*
INTRODUCTION
In November 2016, Kevin Shaw circulated pocket Constitutions
written in the Spanish language to his peers at Pierce College, a
public institution in California.1 Though he stood on a public
sidewalk, an administrator told Shaw that if he did not move to a
designated “free speech zone,” he would be asked to leave campus.2
The speech zone consisted of .003% of the entire campus,
comparable to the area that an iPhone would take up on a tennis
court.3 Shortly thereafter, Shaw filed a lawsuit challenging the zone
*

J.D. Candidate, 2019, Georgia State University College of Law. Thank you to Professor Emeritus L.
Lynn Hogue of GSU Law and Kimberly S. Hermann of Southeastern Legal Foundation, whose wisdom
and guidance have been invaluable during this process and beyond; to the editors at Georgia State
University Law Review for their efforts to finalize this Note; and most importantly, to my loved ones—
there are not enough words to express my gratitude for your patience, words of encouragement,
sacrifices, and good humor these past three years.
1. Student Sues Los Angeles Community College District to Free Over 150,000 Students from
Unconstitutional ‘Free Speech Zones,’ FIRE (Mar. 28, 2017), https://www.thefire.org/student-sues-losangeles-community-college-district-to-free-over-150000-students-from-unconstitutional-free-speechzones/ [https://perma.cc/PQ45-QF3B] [hereinafter Student Sues Los Angeles Community College].
2. Pierce College Student Alleges Constitution Not Allowed to Be Distributed Outside ‘Free
Speech Zone,’ CBS L.A. (Mar. 30, 2017, 11:16 AM), http://losangeles.cbslocal.com/2017/03/30/piercecollege-student-alleges-constitution-not-allowed-to-be-distributed-outside-free-speech-zone/
[https://perma.cc/P8DF-YVUK] [hereinafter Pierce College Student].
3. Id. That same year, people were arrested at Kellogg Community College in Michigan for
distributing pocket Constitutions because they also did not stand in a campus speech zone. Anthony L.
Fisher, Students Arrested for Passing Out Pocket Constitutions on Michigan Community College
Campus Sue School, REASON (Jan. 21, 2017, 7:30 AM), http://reason.com/blog/2017/01/21/studentsarrested-constitutions-michigan [https://perma.cc/S5GH-6CLW]. It appears that some of the distributors
were students, but only non-students were arrested for trespass. John Agar, Kellogg Community College
Rejects Conservative Youth Group’s Speech Complaint, MLIVE MEDIA GROUP, (June 22, 2017),
http://www.mlive.com/news/grand-rapids/index.ssf/2017/06/kellogg_community_college_disp.html
[https://perma.cc/ZS56-BMW5]. The university dropped the trespass charges, but the members of the

387

Published by Reading Room, 2019

1

Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 35, Iss. 2 [2019], Art. 4

388

GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 35:2

as an unconstitutional restriction on his First Amendment rights,
joining many students who have brought similar actions in the past
fifty years.4
Although the right to speak freely is one of America’s most valued
constitutional provisions, courts have never interpreted the
Constitution to guarantee an absolute freedom to speak.5 Restrictions
on speech can occur if they are narrowly limited to certain categories
of speech or if they regulate the time, place, or manner of speech.6 In
addition to permitting limitations on types of speech, courts have
developed precedent that emphasizes the forum—namely, the “public
place . . . devoted to assembly or debate”—in which speech occurs.7
group sued the college for a violation of their First Amendment rights. Id.
4. Pierce College Student, supra note 2; Student Sues Los Angeles Community College, supra note
1; Million Voices Campaign, FIRE, http://www.standupforspeech.com/million-voices-campaign/
[https://perma.cc/JFN7-CUS5] (last visited Oct 16, 2018).
5. See, e.g., FLOYD ABRAMS, THE SOUL OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 11–13 (2017) (writing that
although “[t]he imposition of strict limits on governmental authority over religion, speech, and press
was the central purpose of the First Amendment,” judicial precedent demonstrates that it is not an
absolute freedom; instead, many jurists favor balancing speech “against the democratic needs of civility
and morality”).
6. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571–72 (1942).
There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the
prevention and punishment of which have never been thought to raise any
Constitutional problem. These include the lewd and obscene, the profane, the
libelous, and the insulting or “fighting” words—those which by their very
utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace. It has
been well observed that such utterances are no essential part of any exposition of
ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that
may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order
and morality.
Id. Following Chaplinsky, the Supreme Court held that the guarantees of the First Amendment “do not
permit a [s]tate to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law violation except where such
advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce
such action.” Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969); see also Clark v. Cmty. for Creative NonViolence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984) (relying on case precedent to determine that “[e]xpression, whether
oral or written or symbolized by conduct, is subject to reasonable time, place, or manner restrictions”).
7. Derek P. Langhauser, Free and Regulated Speech on Campus: Using Forum Analysis for
Assessing Facility Use, Speech Zones, and Related Expressive Activity, 31 J.C. & U.L. 481, 495–96
(2005) (“The origin of forum analysis dates back to 1897 when the United States Supreme Court held
broadly that the government was free to control its property as it saw fit.”); Forum, BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014); see also Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672,
678 (1992) (“[I]t is . . . well settled that the government need not permit all forms of speech on property
that it owns and controls.”); Public Forum, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (defining a
public forum as “[a] public place where people traditionally gather to express ideas and exchange
views”). Legal recognition of designated public debate areas dates back to London’s Hyde Park. John J.
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Sometimes, one locale acts as a host for many forums; this is
particularly evident on college campuses.8 For instance, a single
college campus may contain traditional public forums, designated
public forums, and nonpublic forums, which are characterized by the
school’s intended use for each space.9
Courts have historically viewed American universities as the
“quintessential ‘marketplace of ideas,’”10 “where the free and
unfettered interplay of competing views is essential to the
institution’s educational mission.”11 Despite this generally accepted
view of the university’s role, the First Amendment has proven a
controversial subject in the educational realm.12 In seemingly
predictable cycles dating at least to the 1960s, universities enact
restrictive speech policies, triggering a backlash by students, faculty,
and free speech advocates from both the political right and left.13
Brogan, Speak & Space: How the Internet Is Going to Kill the First Amendment as We Know It, 8 VA.
J.L. & TECH. 8, 16 (2003). In the mid-nineteenth century, audiences visited the park to engage in
political speech; when police attempted to intervene and stop the speech, the government faced severe
backlash from English citizens. History of Speakers’ Corner, THE ROYAL PARKS,
https://www.royalparks.org.uk/parks/hyde-park/things-to-see-and-do/speakers-corner
[https://perma.cc/M992-SH5M]. Thus, the government dedicated a portion of Hyde Park—which
became known as the Speakers’ Corner—as a location in which public debate could occur. Id.
8. See, e.g., Bloedorn v. Grube, 631 F.3d 1218, 1232 (11th Cir. 2011).
9. See infra Part I.
10. Thomas J. Davis, Assessing Constitutional Challenges to University Free Speech Zones Under
Public Forum Doctrine, 79 IND. L.J. 267, 275 (2004) (citing Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 180 (1972)).
11. Coll. Republicans at S.F. State Univ. v. Reed, 523 F. Supp. 2d 1005, 1016 (N.D. Cal. 2007)
(quoting Doe v. Univ. of Mich., 721 F. Supp. 852, 863 (E.D. Mich. 1989) (citing Keyishian v. Bd. of
Regents of Univ. of State of N.Y., 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967))); see also JOHN STUART MILL, ON
LIBERTY 86–120 (David Bromwich & George Kaleb, eds., Yale Univ. Press 2003). Mill’s essay is wellknown for its assertion of individual rights, particularly freedom of speech. Id. at 86–87; see also Owen
Fiss, A Freedom Both Personal and Political, in ON LIBERTY 179–95 (David Bromwich & George
Kaleb eds., Yale Univ. Press 2003). Mill argues that silence is an “evil” that “[robs] the human race” of
its own truth-seeking capabilities, and he asserts that no one has the authority to command others to
accept or deny an asserted truth. MILL, supra at 87.
12. See, e.g., Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 504 (1969); Abbott v.
Pastides, 900 F.3d 160 (4th Cir. 2018); Roberts v. Haragan, 346 F. Supp. 2d 853, 856 (N.D. Tex. 2004);
Students Against Apartheid Coal. v. O’Neil, 660 F. Supp. 333, 333–37 (W.D. Va. 1987).
13. Michael Traynor, Citizenship in a Time of Repression, 2005 WIS. L. REV. 1, 16–17 (2005). The
ebb and flow of advocacy for free speech transcends ideological views and is led by different groups at
different times. Id. “Loyalty oaths” against Communism required of university professors, combined
with the Vietnam War draft, caused both liberal and conservative students to fear censorship in the
1950s and 1960s, prompting them to push back against school speech restrictions. Id. The “civility
codes” against hate speech during the 1980s and ‘90s were praised by liberals but met with outcry from
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Currently, our nation is facing changing tides on campuses once
again, with both sides of the political spectrum asserting their
freedom of expression.14
One of the most controversial policies is universities’
establishments of free speech zones.15 Free speech zones are
locations on campus where schools limit permitted student
expression, ranging from disruptive protests to silent leafleting.16
Though school administrators claim that the purpose of these zones is
conservatives. Carolyn M. Mitchell, The Political Correctness Doctrine: Redefining Speech on College
Campuses, 13 WHITTIER L. REV. 805, 805–06 (1992); Kelly Sarabyn, The Twenty-Sixth Amendment:
Resolving the Federal Circuit Split over College Students’ First Amendment Rights, 14 TEX. J. ON C.L.
& C.R. 27, 28 (2008). In contrast, the early 2000s saw a period of resistance, primarily led by liberals,
against Republican-initiated security measures such as the PATRIOT Act. Traynor, supra, at 17–18, 27–
29; see also Arthur R. Miller, Privacy: Is There Any Left?, 3 FED. CTS. L. REV. 87, 101 (2009) (“[A] lot
of people are concerned about the implications for our civil liberties of today’s massive data collection,
especially after 9/11 and the enactment of the PATRIOT Act.”); Nida Siddiqui, N ∑ National Security
Frat Party: Government Surveillance on College Campuses, 9 NE. U. L. REV. 453, 469–71 (2017)
(writing that the PATRIOT Act granted the government broad authority to access student records
without their consent).
14. Arguments over Free Speech on Campus Are Not Left v. Right, ECONOMIST (Sept. 7, 2017),
https://www.economist.com/news/united-states/21728688-reed-college-oregon-shows-left-v-leftclashes-can-be-equally-vitriolic-arguments [https://perma.cc/F4WH-2KN8]; Collin Binkley, College
Campus Free-Speech Zones Face New Scrutiny, Lawsuit, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Mar. 28, 2017,
8:46 PM), https://www.usnews.com/news/us/articles/2017-03-28/campus-free-speech-zones-face-newround-of-scrutiny [https://perma.cc/9DCM-276P]; Maria Danilova & Jocelyn Gecker, Colleges
Grappling with Balancing Free Speech, Campus Safety, MERCURY NEWS (Aug. 19, 2017),
http://www.mercurynews.com/2017/08/19/colleges-grappling-with-balancing-free-speech-campussafety/ [https://perma.cc/UTS6-V5E5]. Groups like the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), a
traditionally left-leaning entity, and the Foundation for Individual Rights in Education (FIRE), widely
recognized as a right-wing nonprofit, are simultaneously leading efforts to combat speech codes at
universities. See, e.g., Jim Sleeper, The Conservatives Behind the Campus ‘Free Speech’ Crusade,
AMERICAN PROSPECT (Oct. 19, 2016), http://prospect.org/article/conservatives-behind-campus%E2%80%98free-speech%E2%80%99-crusade [https://perma.cc/BZ6H-LR7Z]; David E. Weisberg,
ACLU Proves Yet Again It’s a Guardian of Left-Wing Agenda, HILL (Aug. 21, 2017, 2:20 PM),
http://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/civil-rights/347375-aclu-proves-yet-again-its-a-guardian-of-leftwing-movement [https://perma.cc/C2XH-8CSE]. Interestingly, the ACLU even defended the “Unite the
Right” protest that occurred in Charlottesville in 2017, pointing out that “racism and bigotry will not be
eradicated if we merely force them underground.” Joan Biskupic, ACLU Takes Heat for Its Free-Speech
Defense
of
White
Supremacist
Group,
CNN
(Aug.
17,
2017,
5:28
AM),
http://www.cnn.com/2017/08/16/politics/aclu-free-speech-white-supremacy/index.html
[https://perma.cc/S7SR-EEWT].
15. Carol L. Zeiner, Zoned Out! Examining Campus Speech Zones, 66 LA. L. REV. 1, 14 (2005).
16. Davis, supra note 10, at 267–68; see also George Leef, College Officials Tell Students: You May
Speak Freely As Long As It’s Within Our (Tiny) Speech Zone, FORBES (Dec. 15, 2016, 9:00 AM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/georgeleef/2016/12/15/college-officials-tell-students-you-may-speakfreely-as-long-as-its-within-our-tiny-speech-zone/#675f354875cd [https://perma.cc/L6T5-L4ZD].
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to maintain a peaceful learning environment,17 critics argue that the
areas violate First Amendment rights and warn against the
“Orwellian” risks of limiting speech to certain locations.18 Many
litigants have challenged the zones, particularly in the past twenty
years, as violations of the First Amendment.19 Given the existing
model of free speech analysis, where courts consider whether
restrictions are acceptable as to time, place, and manner, free speech
litigation typically depends on the location in which the speech
occurs.20 This has led to highly varied results in such litigation
despite similarities between claims.21
Changing social issues led students to assert their First
Amendment rights in the twentieth century;22 simultaneously, voters
started denouncing discrimination by fighting racial and partisan
gerrymandering.23 The term gerrymandering refers to the division of
geographical areas into units to favor a certain group, often with the
purpose of influencing an election.24 Recently, cases such as Vieth v.
Jubelirer and Gill v. Whitford have turned the Supreme Court of the

17. See Joseph D. Herrold, Capturing the Dialogue: Free Speech Zones and the “Caging” of First
Amendment Rights, 54 DRAKE L. REV. 949, 955–56 (2006). Herrold suggests that universities may
prefer to keep speech “out of the public eye” to prevent controversy or a particular message from being
associated with the university. Id.
18. Ronald
Bailey,
Speakers
Cornered,
REASON
(Feb.
5,
2004),
http://reason.com/archives/2004/02/05/speakers-cornered
[https://perma.cc/2XUG-SV7H];
accord
George Leef, Shouldn’t an Entire Campus Be a Free Speech Zone—Not Just .02 Percent of It?, JAMES
G.
MARTIN
CTR.
FOR
ACAD.
RENEWAL
(Jan.
13,
2017),
https://www.jamesgmartin.center/2017/01/shouldnt-entire-campus-free-speech-zone-not-just-02percent/ [https://perma.cc/H7BU-YUD2].
19. See infra Part I.
20. See, e.g., Bayless v. Martine, 430 F.2d 873, 878 (5th Cir. 1970) (finding a campus speech zone
was a reasonable restriction based on the location in which speech occurred).
21. See Herrold, supra note 17, at 956–58.
22. Zeiner, supra note 15, at 12.
23. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 187–93 (1962); Stephen Wolf, Race Ipsa: Vote Dilution, Racial
Gerrymandering, and the Presumption of Racial Discrimination, 11 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB.
POL’Y 225, 243–44 (1997). “The country experienced a major shift in the 1940s–1960s as civic
nationalism gained ascendancy and figured prominently in the Civil Rights Movement, spelling the end
for white racial nationalism.” Jason Rathod, A Post-Racial Voting Rights Act, 13 BERKELEY J. AFR.-AM.
L. & POL’Y 139, 142 (2011); see also Samuel Issacharoff, Gerrymandering and Political Cartels, 116
HARV. L. REV. 593, 596 (2002) (describing how partisan gerrymandering illustrates “the failure of
constitutional law to ensure the competitive vitality of the political process”).
24. Gerrymandering, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
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United States’s attention to partisan gerrymandering, which is
implemented to “pack” votes to a party’s advantage or “crack” votes
to a group’s disadvantage.25 Though the intricacies of establishing
voter standing or determining a judicially manageable standard are
not relevant to this note, the underlying First and Fourteenth
Amendment implications of the Vieth and Gill cases are quite similar
to the issues courts must consider when faced with campus speech
zones.
This note takes a critical look at the shortcomings of the current
tests applied to speech zone litigation as well as the constitutional
violations that occur when public schools carve out speech areas. Part
I examines the evolution of First Amendment law in education, with
a focus on university free speech zones.26 Part II analyzes the
convoluted First Amendment jurisprudence, suggesting that the time,
place, and manner test, typically used in conjunction with a forum
analysis when examining the constitutionality of speech zones,
allows universities to practice what is known as “expressive
gerrymandering.”27 Finally, Part III proposes that courts eliminate the
place prong of the time, place, and manner test altogether to simplify
some of the complexities associated with free speech litigation on
college campuses.28
I. Background
From the protest-driven 1960s, to the civility movement in the
1980s, followed by the fear of terrorism in the 2000s, university
administrators have had to balance safety concerns with the right to
speak.29 Recent criticism suggests that universities are overstepping
constitutional boundaries, particularly by using speech zones to
25. Gill v. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916, 1920 (2018); Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 289 (2004).
26. See infra Part I.
27. See infra Part II.
28. See infra Part III.
29. See, e.g., Roberts v. Haragan, 346 F. Supp. 2d 853, 870 n.20 (N.D. Tex. 2004) (“Permission for
activities near intersections or during certain hours in close proximity to academic buildings might also
be justified by a significant [u]niversity interest in assuring safety or an environment conducive to study
or teaching.”).
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determine when, where, and how students convey their messages.30
Litigation against gerrymandering arose during the same years that
students began challenging speech restrictions.31 Because
gerrymandering and freedom of speech have followed similar
historical trajectories, courts are once again hearing complaints
against university speech policies while they also attempt to resolve
constitutional issues related to gerrymandering.32
A. The Rise of Free Speech on College Campuses
1. Peace, Protests, and “Parents” No More
The seemingly simple phrase, “Congress shall make no
law . . . abridging the freedom of speech . . . or the right of the people
to peaceably assemble” has given way to a variety of complex
standards and guarantees in the last century.33 Contrary to popular
belief, courts do not always protect speech.34 For instance, authorities
may restrict speech that directly incites others to engage in violence
or “imminent lawless action” in order to serve a substantial
government interest in safety.35
Dissenters began asserting their right to speak in the twentieth
century when the government attempted to suppress new political
ideologies during wartime.36 For instance, courts frequently upheld
state and local government restrictions when speech merely
advocated violence.37 Ultimately, the Supreme Court overturned this
30. See Student Sues Los Angeles Community College, supra note 1.
31. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 187–93 (1962).
32. See, e.g., Speech First, Inc. v. Schlissel, No. CV 18-11451, 2018 WL 3722809, at *1 (E.D. Mich.
Aug. 6, 2018); see also Gill v. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916, 1920 (2018).
33. U.S. CONST. amend. I. See generally WILLIAM J. RICH, 1 MODERN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 5:1
(3d ed. 2017).
34. See, e.g., Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
35. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969).
36. RICH, supra note 33. With war came new ideas that caused citizens to fear communism, fascism,
and other potentially controversial movements. Id.
37. See, e.g., Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211, 216 (1919) (finding that the “natural tendency and
reasonably probable effect” of an anti-war speech was to impede recruitment to the United States
military in violation of the Espionage Act); see also Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 371
(1927), overruled in part by Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (upholding state statute that
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standard, establishing the rule that government entities could only
outlaw speech that was likely to produce imminent lawless action.38
During this time, complaints against government restrictions on free
speech naturally found their way into the university setting.39
Traditionally, schools acted in loco parentis, meaning that
universities had “the power to discipline, control, and regulate their
students to a high degree; they also enjoyed considerable immunity
from liability and insularity from judicial review.”40 Students’ First
Amendment rights were considerably curtailed, and students rarely
brought lawsuits against universities.41 However, the turbulent
climate of the late 1960s became a catalyst for the development of
modern First Amendment law in the educational field.42 During that
decade, students became heavily involved in political and social
issues, including the civil rights movement, the sexual revolution,
and the Vietnam War.43 Although their protests were often peaceful,
some of them grew riotous.44 The Kent State University killings offer
perhaps the most drastic example, and many scholars consider the
made it a crime “to knowingly be or become a member of or assist in organizing an association to
advocate, teach[,] or aid and abet the commission of crimes or unlawful acts of force, violence[,] or
terrorism as a means of accomplishing industrial or political changes”).
38. Brandenburg, 395 U.S. 444, 447, 449 (1969). The Court held in Brandenburg:
[T]he constitutional guarantees of free speech and free press do not permit a
[s]tate to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law violation
except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent
lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action.
....
. . . The contrary teaching of Whitney v. California, supra, cannot be supported,
and that decision is therefore overruled.
Id.
39. Zeiner, supra note 15, at 12–13; see also Herrold, supra note 17, at 956.
40. Zeiner, supra note 15, at 12–13.
41. Id. at 13.
42. Id.;
The
Free
Speech
Movement:
Overview,
CALISPHERE,
https://calisphere.org/exhibitions/43/the-free-speech-movement/#overview
[https://perma.cc/TJD4ZWZ2] (last visited Oct. 16, 2018).
43. The Student Movement of the 1960s, STUDY.COM, http://study.com/academy/lesson/the-studentmovement-of-the-1960s.html [https://perma.cc/554P-VLV9] (last visited Oct. 16, 2018) (describing how
opposition to racism on college campuses in the south evolved into broader movements toward
“liberation” from the “conformist culture of the 1950s”).
44. Michael J. Hampson, Protesting the President: Free Speech Zones and the First Amendment, 58
RUTGERS L. REV. 245, 251 (2005) (writing that protestors conducted peaceful protests by expressing
“their political discontent through bus boycotts, freedom rides, sit-ins, and public meetings”).

https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol35/iss2/4

8

Howard: No Place for Speech Zones: How Colleges Engage in Expressive Gerr

2019]

NO PLACE FOR SPEECH ZONES

395

subsequent Supreme Court case as a turning point in educational
law.45
In 1970, hundreds of students assembled at Kent State to protest
the Vietnam War.46 Though initially peaceful, the gathering turned
violent and destructive in the days that followed.47 When the Ohio
National Guard attempted to disperse the protest from the University
Commons, members of the Guard suddenly fired into the crowd,
killing four students and injuring nine.48 The students sued the
university president for damages and various civil rights claims.49
The district court dismissed the claims for lack of jurisdiction, as was
typical for student lawsuits at the time.50 However, the Supreme
Court reversed the lower court and essentially rejected the immunity
traditionally granted to universities, holding that students may sue
colleges for civil rights violations.51
This holding was a notable departure from the traditional in loco
parentis doctrine that had previously granted schools wide discretion
and immunity.52 These new protections for students even applied to
minors.53 Tinker v. Des Moines Independent School District was a
landmark case that upheld students’ free speech rights when middle
and high schoolers were punished for wearing black armbands to
protest the Vietnam War.54 The Supreme Court noted that the school
had “an urgent wish to avoid the controversy [that] might result
from . . . opposition to this [n]ation’s part in the conflagration in

45. Zeiner, supra note 15, at 13–14, 61 n.55 (2005) (“Four student protestors who presented no
threat of deadly force were shot and killed by Ohio National Guardsmen at Kent State University on
May 4, 1970.”).
46. Kent
State
Shooting,
HISTORY,
http://www.history.com/topics/kent-state-shooting
[https://perma.cc/9KLB-M4U6] (last visited Oct. 16, 2018).
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 232 (1974).
50. Id.
51. See generally id. at 232–50.
52. Id. at 238.
53. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 504 (1969).
54. Id. at 504.
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Vietnam,” but the risk of disturbance in the classroom is a risk the
Constitution “says we must take.”55
The Court further held that, in order to justify a restriction on
speech, a school must demonstrate that the speech would “materially
and substantially interfere with . . . the operation of the school.”56
Most notably, the Court carved out an exception that has bolstered
school-imposed speech restrictions and has become a major source of
case precedent: the time, place, and manner test.57 The test’s general
proposition is that “the state may . . . enforce regulations of the time,
place, and manner of expression which are content-neutral, are
narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest, and
leave open ample alternative channels of communication.”58
During this decade, schools also began taking measures to promote
a learning environment that was not disruptive by establishing areas

55. Id. at 508, 510. Although it should be noted that Tinker is not directly controlling here because
the First Amendment applies differently in postsecondary institutions, the case at least illustrates the
most basic free speech protections that extend to college students. In other words, college students likely
possess even greater protection than what the Court describes in Tinker. See, e.g., Coll. Republicans at
S.F. State Univ. v. Reed, 523 F. Supp. 2d 1005, 1015 (N.D. Cal. 2007).
[I]n some circumstances secondary schools may regulate speech or expressive
conduct that otherwise would be protected . . . .
. . . [T]he courts have given weight to the mandatory nature of primary and
secondary education, the fact that students in these environments typically are
minors, and the “custodial and tutelary” responsibilities the schools must
shoulder for the children.
. . . [T]he state does not require higher education and has much less interest in
regulating it, the students in colleges and universities are not children, but
emancipated (by law) adults, and, critically, the mission of institutions of higher
learning is quite different from the mission of primary and secondary schools.
Id. at 1015.
56. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 509.
57. Id. at 513 (stating that student conduct “which for any reason—whether it stems from time,
place, or type of behavior—materially disrupts classwork or involves substantial disorder or invasion of
the rights of others is, of course, not immunized by the constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech”);
see also Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 192–93 (1972) (finding that “reasonable regulations with respect
to the time, the place, and the manner in which student groups conduct their speech-related . . . activities
must be respected”).
58. Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983); see also Narrowly
Tailored, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (defining the term as “being only as broad as is
reasonably necessary to promote a substantial governmental interest that would be achieved less
effectively without the restriction; no broader than absolutely necessary”).
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for student expression.59 The first lawsuit involving a college free
speech zone was Bayless v. Martine, occurring just one month after
the Kent State shooting and one year after Tinker.60 In this case,
students challenged the university’s refusal to allow them to protest
in an area “located between two classroom buildings” because it
would disrupt classes and block the flow of traffic.61 The Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals struck down the students’ challenge,
applying the new time, place, and manner test.62 The court found that
a university’s nondiscriminatory security interests outweighed
students’ desire to speak in a certain location.63 As speech litigation
became more common at universities, the Supreme Court created
protections for symbolic speech and protests, and struck down
restrictions based on the viewpoints of the speaker.64 At the same
time, however, it deferred to speech restrictions on government
property—namely, college campuses—when the property was not “a
traditional locus of free speech activity.”65
2. Hate Speech, Terror, and the Rise of Speech Zone Litigation
The late 1980s and early 1990s saw another period of unrest on
campuses with the emergence of school policies against hate
speech.66 Furthermore, largely in response to the September 11th
59. Herrold, supra note 17, at 950; Traynor, supra note 13, at 17–18.
60. David S. Allen, Spatial Frameworks and the Management of Dissent: From Parks to Free
Speech Zones, 16 COMM. L. & POL’Y 383, 415 (2011).
61. Bayless v. Martine, 430 F.2d 873, 875 (5th Cir. 1970).
62. Id. at 878. The court considered it “admirable” that university administrators went “the extra
mile” to offer alternative locations for the speakers. Id.
63. Id. at 878–79.
64. RICH, supra note 33.
65. Id.
66. Zeiner, supra note 15, at 22–23. The rise of hate speech codes accompanied an “epidemic” of
hate crimes across the nation in the early 1990s. Mitchell, supra note 13, at 815–16; see also Speech,
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (adding a definition for hate speech in 1988 and defining it
as “speech that carries no meaning other than the expression of hatred for some group, such as a
particular race, esp. in circumstances in which the communication is likely to provoke violence”).
Though there was little controversy about campus speech zones during that decade, universities
currently employ the same justifications for speech zones as they did for speech codes in the 1990s:
namely, that a university has a duty and objective to “foster a culture of respect, inclusion, and civility.”
Janet Napolitano, “Only Yes Means Yes”: An Essay on University Policies Regarding Sexual Violence
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terrorist attacks, designated free speech areas resurfaced at
universities in the early 2000s.67 Politically-liberal students and
scholars considered this an oppressive measure by the George W.
Bush administration.68 However, lawsuits during that time suggested
that students on all sides of the political spectrum took issue with the
speech zones.69
Many of the lawsuits in the early 2000s involved disciplining
students who engaged in disruptive speech outside of the designated
areas.70 In one instance, police arrested a student for stepping outside
of a California community college’s speech zone.71 At West Virginia
University, police intervened when students attempted to hold signs
and distribute anti-Disney flyers outside of a speech zone.72 After the
Foundation for Individual Rights in Education (FIRE) intervened, the
university agreed to meet with students and ultimately revised its
policy to be more speech-friendly.73 In another case, a student wanted
to speak against homosexuality in a location near the Texas Tech
campus, but the university sent him to its free speech gazebo
instead.74 An administrator then admitted that the student’s “personal
belief” did not benefit the “entire [u]niversity community,” and thus,

and Sexual Assault, 33 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 387, 389 (2015); accord Zeiner, supra note 15, at 18–21.
67. Herrold, supra note 17, at 954.
68. AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, FREEDOM UNDER FIRE: DISSENT IN POST-9/11 AMERICA 11
(2003).
A favorite tactic of the Bush administration has been to herd protesters at presidential appearances into
“designated protest zones” . . . . The policy, applied only to those with dissenting views, has been used
to suppress dissent nationwide, and ACLU lawyers around the country are working to get charges
dropped against people arrested for nothing more than wanting to voice their opinion during a
presidential visit.
Id.; see also Traynor, supra note 13, at 3–7.
69. Zeiner, supra note 15, at 1.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Davis, supra note 10, at 267, 296.
73. Michael A. Fuoco, Students Protest WVU Free Speech Zones, (Feb. 13, 2002), http://old.postgazette.com/regionstate/20020213freespeech0213p4.asp
[https://perma.cc/F6QF-QAHL];
Mary
Kershaw, WVU Students are at Greater Liberty to Protest, FIRE (May 12, 2002)
https://www.thefire.org/media-coverage/wvu-students-are-at-greater-liberty-to-protest/
[https://perma.cc/DRD7-U66D].
74. Roberts v. Haragan, 346 F. Supp. 2d 853, 856 (N.D. Tex. 2004).
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did not deserve a more convenient location.75 The district court
struck this down as content-based discrimination, but it warned that
even if the regulation was content-neutral, the school failed to show:
[H]ow its interests in controlling[,] harassing[,] or insulting
student speech [were] significant enough to justify trespass
on students’ First Amendment freedom . . . . Students
. . . rightly expect to have open to them public forums
where their freedom of expression is not unnecessarily
discounted in relation to governmental concerns.76
Whereas some courts struck down speech zones as overbroad
because the zones were likely to discriminate against speakers, even
if they were neutral as to speakers’ viewpoints, others upheld the
zones as “reasonable and viewpoint neutral” even if they were “rather
narrow and limiting.”77 Many of these decisions turned on the forum
in which the speech occurred.78 A public forum is a location open to
all members of the public for expression, whereas a nonpublic forum
refers to a space that is reserved for private use.79 A public forum can
be traditional, meaning it has always been available to the public, or
it can be designated, meaning the government has taken an
affirmative step toward recognizing the public nature of the forum.80
Courts have begun to recognize a third type of public forum known
as the limited public forum.81 The government creates a limited
public forum when it “intentionally opens a facility”82 or reserves
75. Id. at 856–57.
76. Id. at 872.
77. Id. at 871–73; see also Ala. Student Party v. Student Gov’t Ass’n of the Univ. of Ala., 867 F.2d
1344, 1347 (11th Cir. 1989); Herrold, supra note 17, at 957–59.
78. Herrold, supra note 17, at 958.
79. Minn. Voters All. v. Mansky, 138 S. Ct. 1876, 1885 (2018); Davis, supra note 10, at 270.
80. Davis, supra note 10, at 270. “To determine if a designated forum exists, a court ‘look[s] to the
policy and practice of the government to ascertain whether it intended to designate a place not
traditionally open to assembly and debate as a public forum.’” Id. (citing Cornelius v. NAACP Legal
Def. & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 802 (1985)).
81. See, e.g., Ala. Student Party, 867 F.2d at 1350, 1353.
82. Susan McDermott, Single-Sex Education and the First Amendment: Sex-Based Exclusion from
Public School on the Basis of Time, Place, or Manner Restrictions, 12 WIS. WOMEN’S L.J. 207, 238
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property “for a limited purpose such as use by certain groups . . . or
for the discussion of certain subjects.”83 The standard applied to
limited public forums ultimately depends on how a university treats
the space.84 If the reserved facility is open to the public, it is treated
as a public forum.85 If it is closed to the general public, it is treated as
a nonpublic forum.86
3. Speech Zones and “Snowflakes”: Campus Tension
Mounting
Students are once again filing complaints against campus speech
policies with similar results to the cases from the early 2000s. In
2011, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals struck down a challenge
to Georgia Southern University’s free speech zone, an outdoor area
located near the student center.87 The court found that the zone was
narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest, thus
passing the time, place, and manner test.88 The following year, in
contrast, a district court in Ohio held that the University of
Cincinnati’s free speech zone, “less than one tenth the size of a
football field,” was unconstitutional because the restriction on speech
implemented through the zone was overbroad and not narrowly

(1997).
83. Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 46, n. 7 (1983). In these
forums, “‘the class of speakers for whose especial benefit the forum was created’” may exclude others
from assembling there. Bloedorn v. Grube, 631 F.3d 1218, 1237–39 (11th Cir. 2011) (citing Cornelius,
473 U.S. at 806).
84. McDermott, supra note 82.
85. Id. at 238–240.
86. See id.
87. Bloedorn, 631 F.3d at 1237–39.
88. Id. Though the plaintiff was a member of the public, rather than a student, this decision indicates
that the Eleventh Circuit will likely uphold school speech areas in the future, regardless of who the
speaker is, provided that the zones meet the relevant constitutional standards. Id. Similarly, a University
of South Carolina student brought a lawsuit against his school in 2016, claiming that requiring advanced
registration and a fee for a free speech event on campus created “a de facto speech zone.” Abbott v.
Pastides, 263 F. Supp. 3d 565, 572 (D.S.C. 2017), aff’d, 900 F.3d 160 (4th Cir. 2018). The court held
that the speech zone issue was moot because the school amended its registration policy, but it upheld the
school’s decision that certain advertisements were too controversial to display on campus,
demonstrating a somewhat deferential attitude toward the college. Id. at 579-82.
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tailored to serve a compelling government interest.89 Similarly, Kevin
Shaw’s lawsuit against Pierce College regarding the school’s
designated speech zone, “which measures 616 square feet[,] or about
the size of three parking spaces,” was recently resolved.90 A federal
district court in California ruled that Pierce College’s restrictions
were far too broad given the small portion of space available for
student speech and the lack of any alternative spaces for student
expression.91 Even the Department of Justice has joined the attack on
university speech codes.92
Furthermore, at least nine states have recently enacted legislation
to abolish free speech zones, and more states may follow.93 Most of
the legislation is based on models created by FIRE and the Goldwater
Institute.94 Each bill employs the same or similar language that no
public college or university can discriminate against student speech
based on content, while still allowing colleges to restrict the time,
place, or manner of speech.95
89. Univ. of Cincinnati Chapter of Young Ams. for Liberty v. Williams, No. 1:12-CV-155, 2012
WL 2160969, at *1, *6–7 (S.D. Ohio June 12, 2012).
90. Shaw v. Burke, No. 217CV02386ODWPLAX, 2018 WL 459661, at *9 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 17, 2018)
(finding that although the university had a significant interest in avoiding disruption, the small size of its
speech zone unnecessarily burdened student expression); Perry Chiaramonte, LA College Sued by
Student for Allegedly Curbing his Free Speech Rights, FOX NEWS (Mar. 29, 2017),
http://www.foxnews.com/us/2017/03/29/la-college-sued-by-student-for-allegedly-curbing-his-freespeech-rights.html [https://perma.cc/738D-VT9Q].
91. Shaw, 2018 WL 459661, at *9.
92. See Speech First, Inc. v. Schlissel, No. CV 18-11451, 2018 WL 3722809, at *1 (E.D. Mich. Aug.
6, 2018) (submitting a statement of interest in a case involving a college’s anti-harassment policy and
investigation procedures for bias incidents); see also David Jesse, DOJ: Free Speech Has Come Under
Attack on Campuses, GOVERNING (June 12, 2018), http://www.governing.com/topics/education/tnsuniversity-michigan-doj.html [https://perma.cc/W8MJ-H44W].
93. Andrew Blake, Florida Lawmakers Ban ‘Free Speech Zones’ on College Campuses, WASH.
TIMES (Mar. 6, 2018), https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2018/mar/6/florida-lawmakers-ban-freespeech-zones-college-ca/ [https://perma.cc/4TYU-P3A5]; Sophie Quinton, Charlottesville May Put the
Brakes on Campus Free Speech Laws, HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 24, 2017, 10:36 AM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/charlottesville-may-put-the-brakes-on-campus-freespeech_us_599ee3b9e4b0cb7715bfd39c [https://perma.cc/YC45-9R5F]; Adam Sabes, Georgia Becomes
9th State to Pass Free Speech Legislation, CAMPUS REFORM (May 15, 2018, 9:56 AM),
https://www.campusreform.org/?ID=10903 [https://perma.cc/M4DC-UEU5];
94. Robert Shibley, Goldwater Institute Releases Model Campus Free Speech Legislation for States,
FIRE (Jan. 31, 2017), https://www.thefire.org/goldwater-institute-releases-model-campus-free-speechlegislation-for-states/ [https://perma.cc/MU3S-32LC].
95. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-1865 (2017); COLO. REV. STAT. § 23-5-144 (2017); VA.
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In the past few years, there has been a firestorm of speakers and
opinion pieces lashing out against school speech policies, and
tensions appear to be escalating on campus.96 Some scholars point to
the political correctness ideology and increased attentiveness to
cultural and racial differences, as well as stricter punishment for
sexual assault cases and enforcement of safe spaces, as elements that
have contributed to an environment of stifled speech.97 Many pundits
CODE ANN. § 23.1-900.1 (2017); see also Quinton, supra note 93. The enactment of these statutes
primarily arose from concerns about the “pattern” of “belligerent protests” at universities, particularly
when speakers are invited to campus and then disinvited following student backlash. Samantha
Raphelson, States Consider Legislation to Protect Free Speech on Campus, NPR (May 5, 2017, 6:29
PM), https://www.npr.org/2017/05/05/527092506/states-consider-legislation-to-protect-free-speech-oncampus [https://perma.cc/3FSG-NK5U].
96. Kashana Cauley, When Conservatives Suppress Campus Speech, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 17, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/17/opinion/conservatives-campus-speech-wisconsin.html
[https://perma.cc/63QU-9R85]; Elliot C. McLaughlin, War on Campus, CNN (May 1, 2017),
http://www.cnn.com/2017/04/20/us/campus-free-speech-trnd/index.html
[https://perma.cc/H3BZH83Q].
97. See, e.g., Roger Pilon, Vice President for Legal Affairs, Cato Institute, Address at Troy
University:
Academic
Freedom
and
Free
Speech,
1–4
(Mar.
16,
2016),
https://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/pilon-academic-freedom-speech.pdf
[https://perma.cc/AE3T-YMQN]. In 2016, the administration at Bowdoin College punished students for
attending a tequila-themed birthday party at which students wore small sombreros. Id. at 3; see also
Koos Couvée, Students Offered Counselling Over Small Sombrero Hats at Tequila-Themed Birthday
Party,
INDEPENDENT
(Mar.
6,
2016,
4:30
PM),
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/students-offered-counselling-over-small-sombrerohats-at-tequila-themed-birthday-party-a6915521.html [https://perma.cc/VZ25-6QE8]. The college
condemned the party as an “act of ethnic stereotyping” and even offered counseling to students offended
by the incident. Id. In addition to removing party-goers from their dorms, the school’s student
government attempted to impeach two members who were present at the party, but it abandoned the
proceedings when it became clear that it lacked the appropriate procedures in its bylaws, prompting
threatened lawsuits by outside parties. Rachael Allen, Articles of Impeachment for BSG Members
Rescinded, BOWDOIN ORIENT (Mar. 10, 2016), http://bowdoinorient.com/bonus/article/11046
[https://perma.cc/P6SX-S49Q]; Pilon, supra at 3. Many students, including those of Latin-American
descent, viewed the college’s response as excessive and unnecessarily restrictive. See, e.g., Francisco
Navarro, The Ownership of Cultures Is Not a Simple Matter of Race and Ethnicity, BOWDOIN ORIENT
(Mar. 4, 2016), http://bowdoinorient.com/bonus/article/11018 [https://perma.cc/CV6F-YKXC] (writing
“I spent the first fifteen years of my life living in Mexico . . . and I do not believe that the tequila party
was an act of cultural misappropriation and deserving of punitive measures for the students involved”);
see also Catherine Rampell, Political Correctness Devours Yet Another College, Fighting over MiniSombreros, WASH. POST (Mar. 3, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/partyculture/2016/03/03/fdb46cc4-e185-11e5-9c36-e1902f6b6571_story.html?utm_term=.2695ae359ded
[https://perma.cc/V8WX-6SL5] (“One student of Guatemalan and Costa Rican heritage . . . pronounced
the whole kerfuffle ‘mind-boggling’ and called the disciplinary consequences a ‘travesty,’ especially in
light of the dining hall’s Mexican night a week later.”). Additionally, in 2011, the Obama administration
issued a letter that came to be known as the “Dear Colleague Letter,” in which the Department of
Education’s Office of Civil Rights encouraged universities to investigate sexual harassment claims to
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have even begun referring to millennials who are offended by speech
as “Generation Snowflake.”98 On the other hand, several academics
argue that curbing hate speech on campus is necessary to promote
values like confidence, emotional stability, diversity, and “access to,
full use of, and enjoyment of educational facilities and
opportunities.”99
The University of California, Berkeley, where the Free Speech
Movement originated in the 1960s, has found itself in the spotlight
once again as a site of newsworthy protests and counter-protests,
particularly when controversial speakers come to campus.100 Events
prevent classrooms from becoming “a hostile environment.” Dear Colleague Letter, U.S. Dep’t of Educ.
Office of C.R., 3–5 (Apr. 4, 2011) (archived by U.S. Dept. of Educ. Office of Civil Rights). Though it
encouraged more immediate action against wrongdoers, the letter left many questions among university
officials and legislators about whether this letter carried the force of law and whether the procedures
suggested were constitutional. Jake New, Must vs. Should, INSIDE HIGHER ED (Feb. 25, 2016),
https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2016/02/25/colleges-frustrated-lack-clarification-title-ixguidance [https://perma.cc/6MKP-52FB]. Furthermore, critics of the letter claimed that it had a direct
chilling effect on speech and inquiry on campus, as professors, particularly those who teach gender and
sexuality, hesitate to discuss potentially offensive or triggering topics. The History, Uses, and Abuses of
Title
IX,
102
BULL.
AM.
ASS’N
U.
PROFESSORS
69,
88
(2016),
https://www.aaup.org/file/TitleIXreport.pdf [https://perma.cc/5J6G-J3Q9]. However, the Trump
administration recently rescinded the Letter. Robby Soave, Breaking: Betsy DeVos Withdraws ‘Dear
Colleague’ Letter That Weaponized Title IX Against Due Process, REASON (Sept. 22, 2017, 12:14 PM),
http://reason.com/blog/2017/09/22/breaking-betsy-devos-withdraws-dear-coll [https://perma.cc/F3ARMA7K].
98. See
Snowflake
Generation,
COLLINS
ENGLISH
DICTIONARY,
https://www.collinsdictionary.com/dictionary/english/snowflake-generation
[https://perma.cc/9FMKNRBU] (last accessed Sept. 18, 2018) (defining the term as “the generation of people who
became adults in the 2010s, viewed as being less resilient and more prone to taking offence than
previous generations”). This reference is a nod to the novel-turned-movie, “Fight Club,” where a line
reads, “You are not special. You are not a beautiful and unique snowflake.” Guy Birchall, ‘I COINED
SNOWFLAKE’ Fight Club Writer Chuck Palahniuk Takes Credit For ‘Generation Snowflake’ Term
And Says ‘Whinging [sic] Left Needs to Stop Being so Offended’, THE SUN (Jan. 24, 2017, 11:08 AM),
https://www.thesun.co.uk/news/2700438/fight-club-writer-chuck-palahniuk-takes-credit-for-generationsnowflake-term-and-says-whinging-left-needs-to-stop-being-so-offended/
[https://perma.cc/9VU9MCAW]. Critics accuse millennials around the world of feeling entitled to favorable treatment—
including freedom from exposure to offensive language—and argue that it is not feasible to treat every
individual as a “unique snowflake.” Rebecca Nicholson, ‘Poor Little Snowflake’—The Defining Insult of
2016,
GUARDIAN
(Nov.
26,
2016,
10:02
AM),
https://www.theguardian.com/science/2016/nov/28/snowflake-insult-disdain-young-people
[https://perma.cc/WL5S-7G8X ].
99. Zeiner, supra note 15, at 20.
100. The Free Speech Movement: Overview, supra note 42; Berkeley Free Speech Protests: Arrests,
Injuries,
Damages
since
February,
FOX
NEWS
(Apr.
25,
2017),
http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2017/04/25/berkeley-free-speech-protests-arrests-injuries-damages-
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that took place in Charlottesville, Boston, and the city of Berkeley in
the summer of 2017 turned the nation’s attention to the free speech
debate outside of the university environment.101 As colleges prepared
since-february.html [https://perma.cc/3ZCS-C6CJ]. In one instance, protests broke out in response to
controversial speaker Milo Yiannopoulos’s scheduled speech in February 2017, causing $100,000 in
damage. Id. In another instance, despite concern over conservative speaker Ben Shapiro’s reputation, the
university allowed him to speak in September 2017, promising enhanced security and “support services”
for students and faculty “made to feel threatened or harassed” by his words. Riya Bhattacharjee,
‘Snowflake Alert’: Ben Shapiro Responds to UC Berkeley’s Offer for Counseling to Students ‘Impacted’
by His Speech, NBC (Sept. 8, 2017, 3:26 PM), http://www.nbcbayarea.com/news/local/UC-BerkeleyOffers-Security-Counceling-For-Those-Affected-by-Ben-Shapiro-Speech-443310293.html
[https://perma.cc/YDR4-AQDS]. Police in riot gear arrested nine protesters during the event for
“carrying banned weapons,” and security for the day cost an estimated $600,000. Madison Park, Ben
Shapiro Spoke at Berkeley as Protesters Gathered Outside, CNN (Sept. 15, 2017, 5:04 AM),
http://www.cnn.com/2017/09/14/us/berkeley-ben-shapiro-speech/index.html [https://perma.cc/WQ83XRRZ]; Elise Ulwelling, Ben Shapiro’s Visit Cost UC Berkeley an Estimated $600k for Security, DAILY
CALIFORNIAN (Sept. 17, 2017), http://www.dailycal.org/2017/09/17/uc-berkeley-security-costs-benshapiros-visit-estimated-600k/ [https://perma.cc/PEM4-YQQX]. Even small, private schools have
undergone similar incidents; at Middlebury College, a professor suffered a concussion when students
protesting a controversial speaker mobbed her car. Travis Andersen, Middlebury College Punishes
Students who Disrupted Charles Murray Talk, BOS. GLOBE (April 29, 2017),
https://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2017/04/28/middlebury-college-lowers-boom-campus-protesterswho-disrupted-charles-murray-talk/ZDuJOxqvw1m2MsmQr4S0hO/story.html [https://perma.cc/XK7YHXP5]. Though the school punished as many as sixty-seven students, some argued that this was too
lenient. Richard Cohen, Protesters at Middlebury College Demonstrate ‘Cultural Appropriation’—of
Fascism, WASH. POST (May 29, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/protesters-atmiddlebury-college-demonstrate-cultural-appropriation—of-fascism/2017/05/29/af2a3548-4241-11e79869-bac8b446820a_story.html?utm_term=.107d28264117 [https://perma.cc/X3LT-SCRS]; Stephanie
Saul, Dozens of Middlebury Students Are Disciplined for Charles Murray Protest, N.Y. TIMES (May 24,
2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/24/us/middlebury-college-charles-murray-bell-curve.html
[https://perma.cc/X88S-92QT]. Ironically, the professor did not even agree with the speaker’s views.
Andersen, supra.
101. Daniella Silva, U.S. Cities Brace for Upcoming Right-Wing Rallies in Wake of Charlottesville,
NBC (Aug. 16, 2017, 2:02 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/u-s-cities-brace-upcomingright-wing-rallies-wake-charlottesville-n792956 [https://perma.cc/K9G6-AWP8]. In Charlottesville,
members of the Ku Klux Klan assembled to protest what they called “the ongoing cultural
genocide . . . of white Americans.” Sarah Toy, KKK Rally in Charlottesville Met with Throng of
Protesters, USA TODAY (July 9, 2017 10:26 AM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nationnow/2017/07/08/kkk-holds-rally-virginia-and-met-protesters/462146001/
[https://perma.cc/EQ77XXB5]. Counter-protesters arrived, and violence erupted. Ralph Ellis, The KKK Rally in Charlottesville
Was
Outnumbered
by
Counterprotesters,
CNN
(July
10,
2017
3:14
AM),
http://www.cnn.com/2017/07/08/us/kkk-rally-charlottesville-statues/index.html
[https://perma.cc/EQV6-4UBA]. Following the events in Charlottesville, the Boston Free Speech
Coalition attempted to hold a Free Speech Rally. Meghan E. Irons, Who Is the Boston Free Speech
Coalition
Behind
Saturday’s
Rally?,
BOS.
GLOBE
(Aug.
16,
2017),
https://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2017/08/15/who-boston-free-speech-coalition-behind-saturdayrally/eRrE4qpFSBKC4pD8T1iHjI/story.html [https://perma.cc/TFN6-2Y2W]. The organizers of the
event denounced white supremacy and attempted to distance themselves from the Charlottesville
protests, but thousands of counter-protesters assembled, accused the speakers of alt-right views, and shut
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for backlash and potentially harmful protests in the wake of these
events, some may have been overzealous in their efforts to prevent
instances of hatred and racism. For instance, at the University of
Nebraska-Lincoln, university staff members, including professors,
allegedly harassed a student leader who was promoting capitalism
and limited government.102 Though staff members accused the
student of being a member of the Ku Klux Klan while directing
“vulgar gestures” at her, the university’s president simply classified
the incident as a “missed opportunity” to promote civil discussion.103
down the event. Meghan Barr, John Waller, & Dialynn Dwyer, Here’s What Happened at the ‘Free
Speech’ Rally and Counter-Protests on Boston Common, BOSTON (Aug. 20, 2017 7:15 PM),
https://www.boston.com/news/local-news/2017/08/19/live-updates-free-speech-rally-counter-protestsboston-common [https://perma.cc/RJB6-3QQX]. The following week, a woman attempted to host a “No
to Marxism in America” event in which she also clarified that white supremacists were unwelcome.
Emilie Raguso, ‘Anti-Marxist’ Rally Organizer: Violence, White Supremacists Not Welcome,
BERKELEYSIDE (Aug. 24, 2017 4:57 PM), http://www.berkeleyside.com/2017/08/24/anti-marxist-rallyorganizer-says-white-supremacists-violence-not-welcome-berkeley/
[https://perma.cc/U6RT-56ZR].
Even though she canceled the event after receiving violent threats, counter-protesters assembled in the
park on the scheduled day, and violence ensued. Ron-Gong Lin II, Berkeley Right-Wing Protest
Organizer Explains Cancellation In Letter, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 26, 2017, 2:02 AM),
http://www.latimes.com/local/california/la-me-bay-area-protests-berkeley-right-wing-protest-organizer1503738153-htmlstory.html [https://perma.cc/JX6M-FXZ8]; Violence Breaks Out at Berkeley Rally
Where Counter-Protesters Vastly Out Number Trump Supporters, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 27, 2017, 11:21
AM), http://ktla.com/2017/08/27/after-peaceful-demonstration-in-san-francisco-second-counter-protestexpected-in-berkeley/ [https://perma.cc/NKG9-3WQR].
102. Rick Ruggles, UNL Sophomore Says She Was Berated and Intimidated While Trying to Recruit
Students for Conservative Group, OMAHA WORLD HERALD (Aug. 30, 2017),
http://www.omaha.com/news/education/unl-sophomore-says-she-was-berated-and-intimidated-whiletrying/article_1187dc24-837c-51ad-9387-17f2ed7e6b5c.html [https://perma.cc/K6JE-UZPQ]; TURNING
POINT USA, https://www.tpusa.com/ [https://perma.cc/UDL8-RGME]; UNL President Responds to
Free
Speech
Clash
on
Campus,
WOWT
(Aug.
28,
2017
8:54
PM),
http://www.wowt.com/content/news/UNL-President-responds-to-free-speech-clash-on-campus442064643.html [https://perma.cc/5SH5-CLUP].
103. UNL President Responds to Free Speech Clash on Campus, supra note 102; accord Chris
Dunker, UNL Again Finds Itself in Midst of Free Speech Debate, LINCOLN J. STAR (Aug. 30, 2017),
http://journalstar.com/news/local/education/unl-again-finds-itself-in-midst-of-free-speechdebate/article_a9a3b96d-46f1-5009-8ebe-b6fbb56711a5.html [https://perma.cc/3EN3-JVQJ]. Three
months later, two communications directors left the university due to fallout from the incident. Rick
Ruggles, Lecturer Accused of Harassing Conservative Student Will No Longer Work at UNL; 2 PR
Officials
Also
Out,
OMAHA
WORLD
HAROLD
(Nov.
19,
2017),
https://www.omaha.com/news/education/lecturer-accused-of-harassing-conservative-student-will-nolonger-work/article_0a127208-cbfa-11e7-89dd-2b859c3ef2bd.html
[https://perma.cc/ZC2R-AYER].
The UNL president also announced that a professor involved in the incident—who referred to the
student as a “neo-fascist”—would remain at the school until her contract expired at the end of the
academic year. Id. Finally, the president sent a letter to state officials recommitting the university to
“open conversation.” Id. These actions indicate that many groups (such as Conservative Review “and
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B. The Simultaneous Rise of Complaints against Gerrymandering
The Civil Rights Movement of the mid-twentieth century went
beyond students’ rights; voters also asserted their rights during this
time by filing complaints against gerrymandering.104 The term
gerrymandering is not exclusively used to describe voter
redistricting; it can more generally refer to “dividing any
geographical or jurisdictional area into political units . . . to give
some group a special advantage.”105 Baker v. Carr was the first
gerrymandering case to reach the Supreme Court, when voters
challenged the Tennessee legislature’s reapportionment plan.106 The
Court found that the issue was not an entirely political question and,
therefore, it was justiciable.107 Thus, lower courts could hear citizens’
claims that gerrymandering violated the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment because it produced an unconstitutional

other organizations”) were dissatisfied with the administration’s initial response to the incident. Id.
104. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 187–93 (1962); Wolf, supra note 23; Rathod, supra note 23; see
also Issacharoff, supra note 23.
105. Gerrymandering, supra note 24. The practice of gerrymandering “existed even before Congress
did,” though the term was officially coined after the governor of Massachusetts, Elbridge Gerry, redrew
the state’s voting districts to favor his own political party. Robert Draper, The League of Dangerous
Mapmakers, ATLANTIC (Oct. 2012), https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2012/10/the-leagueof/309084/ [https://perma.cc/S8R5-U34E]. One district resembled a salamander in its shape, and “the
term gerrymander has been used ever since to describe the contorting of districts.” Id.
106. Baker, 369 U.S. at 187–88.
107. Id. at 209. When it comes to constitutional powers granted solely to the executive and legislative
branches, “separation-of-powers principles have led to the conclusion that it is not the province or duty
of the judiciary to say what the law is.” RICHARD D. FREER & EDWARD H. COOPER, 13C FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3534 (3d ed. 2017). As a result, courts consider political questions
hesitantly and on an ad hoc basis. Baker, 369 U.S. at 211. The Supreme Court established some
guidelines in Baker to assess a political question:
Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political question is found
a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate
political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable
standards for resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding without an initial
policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or the
impossibility of a court’s undertaking independent resolution without expressing
lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government; or an unusual need
for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; or the
potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various
departments on one question.
Id. at 217.
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“impairment of votes.”108 Twenty years later, in Davis v. Bandemer,
the Court was unable to reach a consensus on what “judicially
manageable standard” it should apply in partisan gerrymandering
cases.109 However, it expanded its equal protection jurisprudence,
stating that “unconstitutional discrimination occurs only when the
electoral system is arranged in a manner that will consistently
degrade a voter’s or a group’s influence on the political process as a
whole.”110
Next, in Vieth v. Jubelirer, the Court held that partisan
gerrymandering cases were nonjusticiable given their political
nature.111 A notable change occurred, however, when Justice
Kennedy filed a concurring opinion.112 In it, he introduced a First
Amendment lens as a new way that a court might consider partisan
gerrymandering cases.113
In 2018, Justice Kennedy had the opportunity to expand on this
notion in Gill v. Whitford, a partisan gerrymandering case that
reached the Supreme Court.114 However, Justice Kennedy and his
colleagues did not even reach the First Amendment argument
because the Court unanimously decided that the plaintiffs in Gill
lacked standing.115 The Court did not, at any point, reject the
gerrymandering claim altogether; rather, it remanded the case to the
district court, and it seemed willing to entertain future
gerrymandering claims so long as individual plaintiffs could
demonstrate how they were personally affected by such schemes.116
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.

Id. at 207–08.
Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 123 (1986).
Id. at 110.
Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 267 (2004).
See generally id. at 306–16 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
Id. at 314–15.
See generally Gill v. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916 (2018).
Id. at 1919.

116. Id. at 1933–34. Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Roberts stated:
In cases where a plaintiff fails to demonstrate Article III standing, we usually
direct the dismissal of the plaintiff’s claims. This is not the usual case. It
concerns an unsettled kind of claim this Court has not agreed upon, the contours

Published by Reading Room, 2019

21

Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 35, Iss. 2 [2019], Art. 4

408

GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 35:2

Instead of claiming a statewide injury through the gerrymandering
plan, the plaintiffs should have focused on remedying the vote
dilution that occurred within their own districts.117 The Court seemed
quite sympathetic to the burden placed on individual votes arising
from placement in a packed or cracked district.118
As Justice Thomas noted in his concurring opinion, it was rather
odd that the Court remanded Gill, rather than dismiss the case
altogether, after finding a lack of standing.119 This could indicate the
Court’s general willingness to hear a more particularized
gerrymandering argument in the future. Furthermore, the record of
oral arguments was replete with references to the First
Amendment.120 Justice Kagan, joined by Justices Ginsburg, Breyer,
and Sotomayor, advised the plaintiffs to clarify their First
Amendment argument on remand, noting in her concurrence that this
theory would be helpful to the injured voters.121 It appears that
Justice Kennedy may have won over support for his First
Amendment theory among a majority of his colleagues. Although
Justice Kennedy has since retired, there is still a possibility that his
successors will adopt his dual approach to gerrymandering cases by
combining First and Fourteenth Amendment analyses.122
and justiciability of which are unresolved.
We therefore remand the case to the District Court so that the plaintiffs may have
an opportunity to prove concrete and particularized injuries using evidence—
unlike the bulk of the evidence presented thus far—that would tend to
demonstrate a burden on their individual votes.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
117. Id. at 1930.
118. Id. at 1931.
119. Gill, 138 S. Ct. at 1941.
120. See generally Transcript of Oral Argument, Gill v. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916 (2018) (No. 161161).
121. Gill, 138 S. Ct. at 1934. Justice Kagan also noted that standing requirements are different for a
First Amendment claim and could be asserted on a broader, statewide level. Id.
122. The Supreme Court heard two other gerrymandering cases during the same term. The first,
Benisek v. Lamone, involved a similar claim by Republicans against a Democrat-initiated redistricting
scheme in Maryland. Benisek v. Lamone, 138 S. Ct. 1942, 1943–44 (2018). The Court dismissed the
case because the plaintiffs were unable to show irreparable harm from the scheme. Id. at 1944. The
Court then remanded the case of Rucho v. Common Cause, ordering North Carolina courts to determine
whether the plaintiff voters had standing in line with the Gill decision. Rucho v. Common Cause, 138 S.
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II. Analysis
Despite hearing First Amendment claims against free speech areas
for the past fifty years, courts have not come any closer to resolving
the debate. The outcomes of these cases largely depend on the forum
in which the zone was located.123 The forum then controls the level
of scrutiny with which courts assess the issue.124 Therefore, a
speaker’s constitutional rights depend on where he chose to stand on
a given day, and courts reach different outcomes because they must
consider these competing layers of analysis.125
A. The Time, Place, or Manner Test in the Context of Forum and
Scrutiny Analyses
1. Types of Forums
As First Amendment jurisprudence developed in schools, courts
began examining the forums in which speech occurred on campus.126
To determine what sort of forum is on a college campus, courts have
developed an analysis examining “the traditional use of the property,
the objective use and purposes of the space, the government intent
Ct. 2679, 2679 (2018). Notably, both cases addressed voters’ First Amendment rights. See Common
Cause v. Rucho, 318 F. Supp. 3d 777, 927 (M.D.N.C. 2018) (“As at least five Justices already have
determined, we conclude that the First Amendment does not draw such fine lines” between governmentimposed restrictions that burden speakers and government-imposed restrictions that burden voters.). See
generally Transcript of Oral Argument, Benisek v. Lamone, 138 S. Ct. 1942 (2018) (No. 17-333).
123. Compare, e.g., Bloedorn v. Grube, 631 F.3d 1218, 1232 (11th Cir. 2011) (finding that a
university was not a traditional public forum, and, therefore, its free speech zone was a permissible time,
place, and manner restriction in a designated public forum, while also finding that the university’s
sidewalks and centrally-located rotunda were limited public forums that justified reasonable speech
restrictions without narrow tailoring), with Students Against Apartheid Coal. v. O’Neil, 660 F. Supp.
333, 338, 340 (W.D. Va. 1987) (finding that a university lawn was a traditional public forum because
there is a “similarity between an open campus lawn and a traditional public forum like municipal parks,”
and that the university failed to tailor its time, place, and manner restrictions narrowly enough).
124. See infra Part II.
125. See infra Part II.
126. See Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 118 (1972) (“Just as Tinker made clear that
school property may not be declared off limits for expressive activity by students, we think it clear that
the public sidewalk adjacent to school grounds may not be declared off limits for expressive activity by
members of the public.”); see also Robert C. Post, Between Governance and Management: The History
and Theory of the Public Forum, 34 UCLA L. REV. 1713, 1714 (1989).
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and policy with respect to the property, and its physical
characteristics and location.”127 Whereas all courts recognize
traditional public forums, designated public forums, and nonpublic
forums, not all courts agree on how to apply the limited public forum
doctrine.128 Because the term suggests that a forum can be both
public and nonpublic at the same time, critics argue that it is
oxymoronic.129 Furthermore, it seems as though limited public
forums and designated public forums are synonymous; in both
situations, a university sets aside some areas on campus for speakers
while reserving other areas for private use.130 Therefore, courts do
not treat all universities as a certain type of forum; instead, they
examine campus forums on an ad hoc basis.
2. Standards of Scrutiny in the Educational Setting
Traditionally, courts assert strict scrutiny when analyzing contentbased restrictions on speech.131 Under that standard of review, the
government must demonstrate that it has a compelling interest in
limiting speech, and that it uses the least restrictive means to do so.132
On the other hand, a content-neutral speech restriction is subject to
intermediate scrutiny because there is a lesser risk that the restriction
127. Univ. of Cincinnati Chapter of Young Ams. for Liberty v. Williams, No. 1:12-CV-155, 2012
WL 2160969, at *3 (S.D. Ohio June 12, 2012).
128. See supra Part I; see also Steven G. Gey, Reopening the Public Forum—from Sidewalks to
Cyberspace, 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 1535, 1555–59, 1569 (1998) (citing Int’l Soc. for Krishna Consciousness,
Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672 (1992)) (writing that even the Supreme Court has been unable to reach a
majority opinion regarding whether a forum is limited and noting that, at the time, Justice Kennedy
seemed hesitant to accept the limited public forum doctrine).
129. Gey, supra note 128, at 1536.
130. Gilles v. Garland, 281 F. App’x 501, 509 (6th Cir. 2008) (stating that “the second type of forum
has been alternatively described as a ‘limited public forum,’ . . . and as a ‘designated public forum.’”);
Ala. Student Party v. Student Gov’t Ass’n of the Univ. of Ala., 867 F.2d 1344, 1350 (11th Cir. 1989)
(finding that a government creates a limited public forum when it “intentionally open[s]”—or
designates—”a nontraditional forum for public discourse”).
131. Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 312 (1988) (finding that a “content-based restriction on political
speech” could not “withstand exacting scrutiny”); Police Dep’t of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95
(1972) (“[T]he First Amendment means that government has no power to restrict expression because of
its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content.”); see also DAVID L. HUDSON, JR., THE FIRST
AMENDMENT: FREEDOM OF SPEECH § 2:2 (2012); RICH, supra note 33, § 5:4.
132. HUDSON, supra note 131. A city ordinance prohibiting a meeting by the local Communist party
is presumptively unconstitutional because it “selectively targets” a political group’s speech. Id.
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will discriminate against particular subjects or viewpoints.133 The
government need only demonstrate that it has a substantial interest in
limiting the speech and that the restriction is narrowly tailored to
achieve that interest.134 Narrow tailoring requires that a regulation
“does not ‘burden substantially more speech than is necessary to
further the government’s legitimate interests.’”135 The time, place, or
manner test falls under this standard.136
In the educational realm, courts have applied scrutiny in a similar
manner. For instance, university regulations of speech within
traditional and designated public forums are treated with strict
scrutiny if they are content-based.137 However, courts have carved
out an exception for time, place, or manner restrictions.138 Such
restrictions must be “justified without reference to the content of the
regulated speech, . . . narrowly tailored to serve a significant
governmental interest, and . . . leave open ample alternative channels
for communication of the information.”139 In a nonpublic or limited
133. Gilles v. Miller, 501 F. Supp. 2d 939, 948 (W.D. Ky. 2007) (“In order for the restriction to be
valid it must not discriminate against speech on the basis of viewpoint and must be ‘reasonable in light
of the purpose served by the forum.’” (quoting Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473
U.S. 788, 806 (1985))); RICH, supra note 33, § 5:4. Content-neutral speech as a category is somewhat
ambiguous, as Justices tend to disagree about a restriction’s neutrality. Id. § 5:5. There is a third
category, known as viewpoint-based discrimination, where universities restrict speech “because of the
speaker’s specific motivating ideology, opinion, or perspective.” Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of
Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995). Courts have never upheld such “egregious” restrictions, and
thus they are not included in this analysis. Id.
134. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 787 (1989) (applying intermediate scrutiny to find
that a city’s noise ordinance was content-neutral and “narrowly tailored to serve significant government
interests”).
135. Pro-Life Cougars v. Univ. of Hous., 259 F. Supp. 2d 575, 582 (S.D. Tex.), appeal dismissed, 67
F. App’x 251 (5th Cir. 2003) (quoting Ward, 491 U.S. at 799).
136. HUDSON, supra note 131, § 2:2. A city regulation limiting the hours during which the local
Communist party can meet is more likely to be constitutional, because it does not regulate which party
can speak; rather, it regulates when a party can speak. Id.
137. Univ. of Cincinnati Chapter of Young Ams. for Liberty v. Williams, No. 1:12-CV-155, 2012
WL 2160969, at *3 (S.D. Ohio June 12, 2012) (citing Miller v. City of Cincinnati, 622 F.3d 524, 534–
535 (6th Cir. 2010)).
138. See Minn. Voters All. v. Mansky, 138 S. Ct. 1876, 1885 (2018) (“In a traditional public forum—
parks, streets, sidewalks, and the like—the government may impose reasonable time, place, and manner
restrictions on private speech, but restrictions based on content must satisfy strict scrutiny, and those
based on viewpoint are prohibited . . . The same standards apply in designated public forums.”); see also
Langhauser, supra note 7, at 502.
139. Ward, 491 U.S. at 791.

Published by Reading Room, 2019

25

Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 35, Iss. 2 [2019], Art. 4

412

GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 35:2

public forum, the standard is much lower.140 The government need
only demonstrate that its regulations are content-neutral and
reasonable.141
On a school campus, content-based discrimination may be difficult
to discover.142 The Tinker case focused on a school policy that
unconstitutionally restricted speech based on its content.143 In another
instance, a district court found that vesting a University of Houston
administrator with “unfettered discretion” to approve or deny student
access to a campus speech zone “[had] the potential for becoming a
means of suppressing a particular point of view,” rendering the
regulation content-based regardless of the time, place, or manner
test.144 The court suggested that, if the administrator had explained
his decision, or if his decision was subject to review, a lower standard

140. Minn. Voters All., 138 S. Ct. at 1885 (“In a nonpublic forum, on the other hand—a space that ‘is
not by tradition or designation a forum for public communication’—the government has much more
flexibility to craft rules limiting speech.”); Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 106
(2001) (“If the forum is a traditional or open public forum, the State’s restrictions on speech are subject
to stricter scrutiny than are restrictions in a limited public forum.”).
141. Univ. of Cincinnati, 2012 WL 2160969, at *3 (citing Miller, 622 F.3d at 534–535); see also
Langhauser, supra note 7, at 503.
142. HUDSON, supra note 131, at § 2:3. “The U.S. Supreme Court has explained that the determining
factor is ‘whether the government has adopted a regulation of speech because of disagreement with the
message it conveys.’” Id. (quoting Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 295
(1984)). In order to meet speech code requirements, a university may feel compelled to deny certain
messages altogether. See, e.g., Mitchell, supra note 13, at 822–23 (1992) (writing that universities must
balance the psychological effects of hate speech, the educational benefits of promoting civility, and fear
of appearing to support hate speech against the ”slippery slope toward censorship and ultimately
totalitarianism” that could result from speech codes).
143. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 504 (1969). After learning of
students’ plans to wear armbands to protest the Vietnam War, the local schools adopted policies
prohibiting that form of speech. Id.; Davis, supra note 10, at 293.
144. Pro-Life Cougars v. Univ. of Hous., 259 F. Supp. 2d 575, 578, 584–85 (S.D. Tex.), appeal
dismissed, 67 F. App’x 251 (5th Cir. 2003). In this case, a group of students wanted to create a “Justice
for All Exhibit” to protest abortion “at any of three suggested grassy areas” on the university’s main
plaza. Id. at 578. A university dean determined that the exhibit “was ‘potentially disruptive’” and
required the group to relocate to other sites that were “too small” and “too far removed” from campus.
Id. at 579. The court found that “the success of a facial challenge on the grounds that an ordinance
delegates overly broad discretion to the decisionmaker [sic] rests not on whether the administrator has
exercised his discretion in a content-based manner, but whether there is anything in the ordinance
preventing him from doing so.” Id. at 584. Thus, a policy generally needs to contain some sort of
limiting language on an administrator’s discretion in order to avoid strict scrutiny; otherwise, the policy
may simply become a means to further the administrator’s particular viewpoint while denouncing a
student’s opinion. Id.
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of scrutiny may have applied.145 On the other hand, the court struck
the policy down simply because it had the potential of becoming
content-based; consequently, this case exemplifies how strict scrutiny
is a difficult standard to overcome, and may be applied even when a
policy is not—but merely could become—content-based.146
3. Putting It All Together: Combining Forums and Scrutiny
Currently, courts can take up to eight alternative approaches when
it comes to assessing speech zone lawsuits against universities.147 A
court may find: (1) a university is a traditional public forum and its
regulation is content-based; (2) a university is a traditional public
forum and its regulation is content-neutral; (3) a university is a
designated public forum and its regulation is content-based; (4) a
university is a designated public forum and its regulation is contentneutral; (5) a university is a nonpublic forum and its regulation is
content-based; (6) a university is a nonpublic forum and its regulation
is content-neutral; (7) a university is a limited public forum and its
regulation is content-based; and (8) a university is a limited public
forum and its regulation is content-neutral.148
Traditional and designated public forum tests produce similar
outcomes. For either forum, if a regulation is content-based, it will be
subject to strict scrutiny and presumptively unconstitutional.149 If the
145. Pro-Life Cougars, F. Supp. 2d. at 583–84. The court held that the administrator’s arbitrary
control violated the First Amendment because his decisions were not subject to review, nor was he
required to provide students with explanations for restricting their speech. Id. There are two problems
posed by the court’s open-ended resolution: first, the court failed to address what kind of explanation for
a restriction would have been enough to meet First Amendment standards. Id. Second, the court did not
seem to consider the fact that other administrators would likely review controversial decisions, and they
may feel inclined to agree with their colleague. Id. This suggests that content-based restrictions could be
subject to lesser scrutiny, so long as an administrator explains his decisions or another administrator
reviews them. Id.
146. Id.
147. This list of approaches does not include viewpoint discrimination because there is no room for
discretion in viewpoint-based claims; if a court finds that a policy is viewpoint-based, it will
automatically find the policy unconstitutional. See Minn. Voters All. v. Mansky, 138 S. Ct. 1876, 1885
(2018) (“[R]estrictions based on content must satisfy strict scrutiny, and those based on viewpoint are
prohibited.”).
148. See Langhauser, supra note 7, at 501–03; supra Part II.
149. See, e.g., Gilles v. Miller, 501 F. Supp. 2d 939, 947 (W.D. Ky. 2007) (citing Perry Educ. Ass’n
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regulation is content-neutral, it must meet the time, place, or manner
test.150 Though still considered a form of strict scrutiny, it is
relatively easy for a university to demonstrate that its restriction on
the time, place, or manner of speech is reasonable and leaves a
speaker with ample alternatives for communication.151 On the other
hand, a speech zone in a nonpublic forum only needs to be
reasonable, regardless of whether the restriction is content-based or
content-neutral.152 Finally, the results of limited public forum
analyses will vary depending on the court hearing the case and the
location of the contested zone. Though some courts treat the specific
location within a limited public forum as a nonpublic forum, others
treat the location like a designated public forum.153 In other words,
v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 44 (1983)); see also Forums, LEGAL INFO. INST.
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/forums [https://perma.cc/GLP6-MT2D] (last visited Oct. 1, 2018);
HUDSON, supra note 131, § 2:2.
150. HUDSON, supra note 131, § 2:2; see also Langhauser, supra note 7, at 501.
151. See, e.g., Roberts v. Haragan, 346 F. Supp. 2d 853, 862 (N.D. Tex. 2004) (“[A]ny restriction of
the content of student speech in [public forums] is subject to the strict scrutiny of the ‘compelling state
interest’ standard, and content-neutral restrictions are permissible only if they are reasonable time, place,
and manner regulations that are narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest and leave
open ample alternative channels of communication.”);
Gilles, 501 F. Supp. 2d at 947 (finding that traditional public forums are subject to strict scrutiny and
that “[t]he government may enforce regulations on the time, place, and manner of expression in
a traditional public forum if the regulations are content-neutral”); Davis, supra note 10, at 270.
152. Roberts, 346 F. Supp. 2d at 860 (“[I]n . . . nonpublic forums, the government may restrict the
forum for its intended purposes, communicative or otherwise, as long as the regulations impose
reasonable content-based restrictions on speech that are not viewpoint-based.”) (citing Perry, 460 U.S.
at 46; Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 800 (1985)); Forums, supra
note 149.
153. Gilles, 501 F. Supp. 2d at 948. In Gilles, the district court stated that the “university is as a whole
a limited public forum” but found that certain speech areas on campus were designated forums. Id. at
947–48. Despite finding that the speech areas were designated forums, the court examined the zones as
if they were nonpublic forums. Id. at 948–49. The court concluded that the policy was content-neutral
and reasonable without examining whether the zones were narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling
government interest. Id. at 949. In Bloedorn v. Grube, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals also treated
the university as a limited public forum. Bloedorn v. Grube, 631 F.3d 1218, 1232 (11th Cir. 2011). It
conducted a nonpublic forum analysis for sidewalks and rotundas on campus, and it found that speech
restrictions in those areas were reasonable. Id. at 1234. However, it conducted a separate designated
forum analysis for the campus “Free Speech Area” and found that the university had a significant
interest to regulate the time, place, and manner of speech in that area. Id. at 1234, 1236–38. It also found
that the restrictions in the speech zone were narrowly tailored and provided ample alternatives for
speech. Id. at 1236–38. In a different case, the Eleventh Circuit determined that the level of scrutiny
applied to limited public forums depended on the government’s intent for the space:
for those topics or speakers for which the government has made the property
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the limited public forum is usually a reiteration of the nonpublic or
designated public forum standards. Below, Figures 1.1 and 1.2 depict
the typical judicial approaches to forum and scrutiny analysis. Figure
1.1 demonstrates the standards when a restriction is content-based,
and Figure 1.2 demonstrates what happens when a restriction is
content-neutral.
Figure 1.1
Forum
Type

Traditional
Public

Designated
Public

Regulation
Type

ContentBased

Nonpublic

ContentBased
ContentBased

Limited
Public

ContentBased

Level of
Scrutiny

Test

Strict

Compelling
Interest + Least
Restrictive Means

Strict

Compelling
Interest + Least
Restrictive Means

Reasonable
Strict or
Reasonable
(Depends on
Court)

Rational Basis
Strict or
Reasonable
(Depends on
Court)

available, a limited public forum is treated as a public forum; for all other topics
or speakers, it is treated as a nonpublic forum . . . As long as the government
maintains the [public] forum . . . it is bound by the same constitutional standards
that apply in a traditional public forum context: “a content-based prohibition
must be narrowly drawn to effectuate a compelling state interest.”
Ala. Student Party v. Student Gov’t Ass’n of the Univ. of Ala., 867 F.2d 1344, 1350 (11th Cir. 1989).
Finally, in a concurring opinion in Gilles v. Garland, a Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals judge discussed a
circuit split when it came to limited public forums; the Fourth Circuit applied the reasonableness
standard to limited public forums, whereas the Fifth and Eighth Circuits applied strict scrutiny to such
places. Gilles v. Garland, 281 F. App’x 501, 514 (6th Cir. 2008) (Moore, J., concurring).
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Figure 1.2
Forum
Type

Regulation
Type

Level of
Scrutiny

Test

Traditional
Public

ContentNeutral

“Strict”

Time, Place or
Manner

Designated
Public

“Strict”

Time, Place or
Manner

Nonpublic

ContentNeutral
ContentNeutral

Limited
Pubic

ContentNeutral

Reasonable
“Strict” or
Reasonable
(Depends on
Court)

Rational Basis
“Strict” or
Reasonable
(Depends on
Court)

B. Problems with Continuing Current Forum and Scrutiny
Analyses
1. Too Many Forums to Function
Rather than view the university as a whole when conducting a
forum analysis, courts consider it a setting with “a variety of fora”
scattered across campus.154 One area of the school may be a
traditional public forum, such as a street or sidewalk, whereas
another area may be closed to the public, like a classroom.155 The
forum analysis complicates speech zone litigation against a university
because litigants must determine what kind of forum they are
154. Bloedorn, 631 F.3d at 1232; Bowman v. White, 444 F.3d 967, 976 (8th Cir. 2006).
155.
Smith v. Tarrant Cty. Coll. Dist., 670 F. Supp. 2d 534, 538–39 (N.D. Tex. 2009).
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challenging and what level of scrutiny the court should apply,
producing diverse arguments and results.156
The location in which a speaker stands has become the deciding
factor of whether he is afforded constitutional protection; if the
speaker cannot successfully argue that the forum is public and that
the university lacks a significant interest in regulating the speech, he
has very little to no chance of winning his case. For instance, even
though an open, grassy area would typically be a traditional or
designated public forum, the area’s proximity to a classroom may
convert it into a nonpublic forum.157 Additionally, given the different
characteristics and levels of scrutiny that may apply on a single
campus, litigants can likely only challenge one university speech
zone at a time rather than challenging the entire school policy.158 This
may deter litigants from contesting the zones altogether.
Finally, even though state legislatures have attempted to remedy
these problems by banning free speech areas on campus, legislation
overlooks one major shortcoming: universities may still reasonably
regulate the time, place, and manner in which speech occurs.159 As a
result, this type of legislation does not appear to do much more than
reiterate longstanding case precedent, and opponents of speech zones
will not be able to turn to these laws for support.160
2. Universities are Exercising an Expressive Gerrymander
Against Speech
Even if universities can justify restricting student speech to certain
areas around campus, regulating speech to geographical zones on
156. Herrold, supra note 17, at 956–58.
157. See Roberts, 346 F. Supp. 2d at 870 n.20 (“Permission for activities near intersections or during
certain hours in close proximity to academic buildings might also be justified by a significant
[u]niversity interest in assuring safety or an environment conducive to study or teaching.”).
158. See, e.g., Bloedorn, 631 F.3d at 1232 (challenging only a few specific locations on campus and
examining each location under separate forum tests).
159. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-1865 (2017); COLO. REV. STAT. § 23-5-144 (2017); VA.
CODE ANN. § 23.1-900.1 (2017).
160. Compare ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-1865 (2017); COLO. REV. STAT. § 23-5-144 (2017); VA.
CODE ANN. § 23.1-900.1 (2017), with Bayless v. Martine, 430 F.2d 873, 878 (5th Cir. 1970).
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campus resembles another form of government zoning:
gerrymandering.161 Justice Kennedy notably departed from the
traditional treatment of gerrymandering cases when he stated that
such “allegations involve the First Amendment interest of not
burdening or penalizing citizens because of their participation in the
electoral process, their voting history, their association with a
political party, or their expression of political views.”162 In that way,
he introduced a First Amendment right to vote free from governmentimposed burdens based on voters’ “ideolog[ies], beliefs, or political
association[s]” as a “subsidiary standard” to Fourteenth Amendment
equal protection claims.163
Just as legislatures alter voting districts to specify where voters can
exercise their constitutional right to vote, universities draw borders
on campus maps designating where speakers can exercise their
constitutional right to speak.164 In both situations, neither the speaker
nor the voter can reach his intended audience.165 When
161. See Timothy Zick, Space, Place, and Speech: The Expressive Topography, 74 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 439, 503 (2006). Zick argues that “spatial tailoring” is a form of “expressive gerrymandering” that
prevents speakers from reaching their intended audience. Id. The Supreme Court has also encountered
various “religious gerrymandering” cases in which plaintiffs argue that a law “gerrymanders” a religious
group when it targets its religious practices. See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of
Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 536–37 (1993) (finding that a city ordinance “punishing
‘[w]hoever . . . unnecessarily . . . kills any animal’” for a ritual, rather than for food consumption,
gerrymandered a religious group who made animal sacrifices, producing a “net result” of discrimination
against that particular religion despite being neutral on its face); see also Gillette v. United States, 401
U.S. 437, 452 (1971) (stating that “the Establishment Clause forbids subtle departures from neutrality,
‘religious gerrymanders,’ as well as obvious abuses”); Symposium, Beyond Separatism: Church and
State: Protecting Religious Liberty: The False Messiahs of Free Speech Doctrine and Formal
Neutrality, 18 J.L. & POL. 119, 155–56 (2002) (noting that a law discriminating against religion or
speech should be subject to strict scrutiny “if the regulation constitutes a . . . gerrymander which has the
effect of singling out a . . . practice for unfavorable treatment”).
162. Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 314 (2004).
163. Id. at 314–16.
164. See Neal H. Hutchens, New Legislation May Make Free Speech on Campus Less Free,
CONVERSATION (June 27, 2017, 9:42 PM), http://theconversation.com/new-legislation-may-make-freespeech-on-campus-less-free-77609 [https://perma.cc/WRL4-H83S] (“[I]nstitutions shouldn’t seek to
restrict students’ First Amendment speech rights to strict borders on campus . . . .”); see also, e.g., Map
of Dixie State University with Free Speech Zone, FIRE (Aug. 1, 2014), https://www.thefire.org/mapdixie-state-university-free-speech-zone/ [https://perma.cc/WRF8-7BQ7].
165. Brief for Colleagues of Professor Norman Dorsen as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellees at
6, Gill v. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916 (2017) (No. 16-1161). In support of their argument opposing
gerrymandering, the writers of the brief drew parallels between voting and speaking:
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gerrymandering occurs, a voter is unable to sway the election
because his vote is rendered ineffective; his vote does not reach the
government branch for which it was intended.166 Likewise, a speaker
relegated to an off-campus gazebo fails to reach her intended
audience and is, thus, preempted from speaking her message.167
Though universities do not necessarily apply speech zone policies
in an overtly discriminatory way, they nevertheless divide a campus
“into political units . . . to give some group a special advantage.”168
Speech areas carry an inherently political undertone to them; by
limiting speech to a certain area on campus, administrators suggest
that they value no speech over some speech, regardless of its
content.169 To illustrate this point, a university may deny both the
College Democrats and the College Republicans the opportunity to

When massive political gerrymandering is used systematically, as here, to
deprive independents and adherents of both major political parties of a fair
opportunity to participate in genuinely contestable elections, it eliminates
genuine choice from the electoral process, and drains the First Amendment
activities of listening, choosing, supporting and voting of practical effect. It is the
First Amendment equivalent of formally permitting a speaker to speak, but
denying her an audience.
Id.
166. See, e.g., Whitford v. Gill, 218 F. Supp. 3d 837, 854 (W.D. Wis. 2016) (explaining that
gerrymandering techniques such as “‘cracking’—’dividing a party’s supporters among multiple districts
so that they fall short of a majority in each one’—and ‘packing’—’concentrating one party’s backers in
a few districts that they win by overwhelming margins,’ [occur] in order to dilute the votes of
Democrats statewide”), vacated, 138 S. Ct. 1916 (2018).
167. Students Against Apartheid Coal. v. O’Neil, 660 F. Supp. 333, 339 (W.D. Va. 1987). The district
court declared that “when a state body provides a citizen with an alternative forum for expression it
should open up a forum that is accessible and where the intended audience is expected to pass.” Id.; see
also Bay Area Peace Navy v. United States, 914 F.2d 1224, 1229 (9th Cir. 1990) (finding “an alternative
is not ample if the speaker is not permitted to reach the ‘intended audience’”); Zick, supra note 161, at
503.
168. Gerrymandering, supra note 24.
169. See Seth F. Kreimer, Good Enough for Government Work: Two Cheers for Content Neutrality,
16 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1261, 1305 (2014). Kreimer writes:
[P]ower devolves often to the hands of potential village tyrants, and doctrine
enjoining officials to balance costs and benefits of expression becomes a
gateway to repression . . . A doctrine that mandates that officials act without
censorial motives [does not fare well], for officials are often blind to their own
motivations, adept at rationalization, and eager to avoid offense to majority
constituents even when they harbor no malice themselves.
Id.
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campaign on the quad for an upcoming presidential election,
reasoning that the university does not want potentially controversial
expression to occur in such an open, traffic-heavy area.170 Although
this policy would not value one party over the other, it would
nevertheless implicitly value nonpolitics over politics, with the
assumption that politics are disruptive.171 The same can be said for a
religious group that wishes to speak near a campus’s chapel to
encourage students to attend a service there. It might be the
university’s typical practice to prohibit any group from speaking in
the area near the chapel. However, this policy not only prevents the
religious group from reaching its intended audience but also has an
underlying effect of promoting non-religious values over religious
ones.172
The elevation of noncontroversy over politics, religion, and
protests is comparable to the equal protection violations that occur in
gerrymandering cases. Just as gerrymandering protects and preserves
a select amount of votes while diluting the rest, speech zones protect
members of campus from hearing potentially uncomfortable topics
while thinly dispersing speakers across campus.173 As the district
court in Whitford v. Gill noted:

170. Bayless v. Martine, 430 F.2d 873, 875 (5th Cir. 1970) (holding that restricting any “interference
with the free flow of traffic” was permissible).
171. See infra note 213.
172. See Roberts v. Haragan, 346 F. Supp. 2d 853, 867 (N.D. Tex. 2004) (citing Horton v. City of
Houston, 179 F.3d 188, 193 (5th Cir. 1999)) (finding that “a rule that has a substantial risk of
eliminating certain ideas or viewpoints from the public dialogue are content-based”).
173. Compare Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 354 (2004) (Souter, J., dissenting) (noting that “the
harm from partisan gerrymandering is . . . a species of vote dilution: the point of the gerrymander is to
capture seats by manipulating district lines to diminish the weight of the other party’s votes”), with Zick,
supra note 161, at 485. Zick writes,
Even in fora traditionally thought to be set aside for expressive activity, zoning
and other seemingly neutral manipulations have fundamentally affected our
relationship with spaces that might otherwise have become expressive places.
Simply stated, the public forum doctrine has produced an expansion of
nonexpressive place . . . In today’s social and political climate, courts are more
inclined to protect the personal space of the “unwilling listener,” even in
traditionally public places.
Id.
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“[C]itizens” exercise their “inalienable right to full and
effective participation in the political process” by voting for
their elected representatives. “Full and effective
participation by all citizens in state government requires,
therefore, that each citizen have an equally effective voice
in
the election of
members
of
his
state
legislature.” Moreover, “the concept of equal protection has
been traditionally viewed as requiring the uniform
treatment of persons standing in the same relation to the
governmental action questioned or challenged.”174
Although the Supreme Court ultimately remanded the plaintiffs’
claims in Gill, it was on the ground that not every plaintiff could
show how the voting scheme impacted his individual vote.175
Similarly, a student challenging a speech regulation must
demonstrate that the restriction curbed his personal right to speak.176
Although that may exclude some students’ claims, there is less
attenuation in the link between a school policy and student speech; a
voter would likely have difficulty demonstrating how a broad
legislative scheme directly impacts him, whereas a speaker would
have much less difficulty demonstrating how a school policy inhibits
his speech.177

174. Whitford v. Gill, 218 F. Supp. 3d 837, 865 (W.D. Wis. 2016) (internal citation omitted) (quoting
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 565 (1964)), vacated, 138 S. Ct. 1916 (2018).
175. Gill v. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916, 1921 (2018).
176. See, e.g., Roberts, 346 F. Supp. 2d at 864 n.12 (“This Court will not stretch the bounds of the
requisite concrete injury that must be shown in order to make an as-applied challenge to include such a
case as this where the [p]laintiff never actually shows up to exercise the right to speak he claims is so
important.”); see also Abbott v. Pastides, 263 F. Supp. 3d 565, 580 (D.S.C. 2017) (finding that a
university had not and would not apply a sexual harassment policy to students after a controversial event
and, as such, the students lacked standing because they failed to demonstrate a “credible threat of
enforcement”) aff’d, 900 F.3d 160 (4th Cir. 2018).
177. Compare Gill, 138 S. Ct. at 1921, with Univ. of Cincinnati Chapter of Young Ams. for Liberty v.
Williams, No. 1:12-CV-155, 2012 WL 2160969, at *7 (S.D. Ohio June 12, 2012) (“Plaintiffs have
established a significant likelihood of success on their claims that the University’s location requirements
unconstitutionally burden their right to free speech” when the university made students relocate to a free
speech zone to seek signatures for a petition).
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Students wishing to participate in the speech process must have an
opportunity for “full and effective participation,” but speech zones
present a burden that inhibits speakers from having “an equally
effective voice.”178 In that way, the First and Fourteenth
Amendments overlap regarding place restrictions on speech, yet
litigants often overlook the fact that both amendments are at play.179
Justice Kennedy’s belief that First Amendment matters underlie
broader Fourteenth Amendment concerns in gerrymandering is
present in the inverse on college campuses; speech zones, though
primarily a First Amendment issue, also invoke some Fourteenth
Amendment concerns because universities can refuse to give speech
a platform altogether by abusing place restrictions.
Of course, a university must frequently balance students’
competing interests. Students outside a chapel wish to encourage
students to attend a service, whereas students inside the chapel wish
to attend their own service without external distractions; similarly,
students protesting on a lawn might disrupt students listening to a
classroom lecture nearby. A university has a compelling interest in
fulfilling its academic mission by balancing students’ diverse needs,
preferring classroom lectures over other forms of speech, and
prioritizing student safety. 180 However, geographical limits are often
not narrowly tailored to serve this interest; instead, they significantly
burden speakers’ choice of audience and deter speech altogether.181
Rather than restrict the location of speech, universities must focus on
restricting the manner of speech—particularly whether the speech
178. Whitford, 218 F. Supp. 3d at 865 (quoting Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 565 (1964)).
179. See, e.g., Gilles v. Miller, 501 F. Supp. 2d 939, 950 (W.D. Ky. 2007) (striking down visiting
speaker’s argument that he had an equal protection interest in being granted access to certain locations
on campus); see also Roberts, 346 F. Supp. 2d at 874 (denying a student’s equal protection claim against
a university speech restriction without providing reasoning).
180. See Roberts, 346 F. Supp. 2d at 872–73 (weighing the university’s “academic mission”—such as
providing “equal access to all the benefits, services, activities, and privileges” offered at the school—
against the chilling effects of speech regulations, particularly in public forums).
181. Pro-Life Cougars v. Univ. of Hous., 259 F. Supp. 2d 575, 584 (S.D. Tex. 2003) (finding that
“[t]o be narrowly tailored, a speech regulation must not burden substantially more speech than is
necessary to further the stated legitimate governmental interest . . . [but authorizing the dean to deny
potentially disruptive events] has burdened more speech than necessary to carry out the University’s
academic mission”) dismissed, 67 F. App’x 251 (5th Cir. 2003).
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produces imminent lawless action—and the permissible time
constraints during which speech can occur.
III. Proposal
Perhaps lawyer Thomas J. Davis said it best when he wrote, “Place
restrictions on student speech are a terrible idea.”182 He made this
assertion in the early 2000s as a law student when a wave of
litigation against free speech zones was emerging.183 Unfortunately,
little progress has been made since then; despite students’ increased
attempts to combat the zones in the courthouse and through the
legislature, universities are still able to regulate speech on campus by
limiting the places in which it occurs.184 Although Davis proposed
that universities should revise their policies to end place
restrictions,185 few colleges have done so.186 Therefore, it is up to the
courts to refuse to recognize place restrictions on speech, particularly
on college campuses. In doing so, courts will create a more
streamlined, simplified litigation process while ensuring that
university speech policies comply with the First and Fourteenth
Amendments. More importantly, it will protect students’
constitutional right to freedom of expression as well as the free flow
of information and academic inquiry.
A. The Place Analysis in the Context of the First Amendment
Eliminating the place prong of the time, place, and manner test
would shift the focus of speech zone litigation away from the
location where a speaker chooses to stand.187 In that way, eliminating
a place test would alleviate the burden that courts currently face
182. Davis, supra note 10, at 297.
183. Id. at 267–68.
184. See supra Part II.
185. Davis, supra note 10, at 297.
186. Samantha Harris, ‘Free Speech Zones,’ Then and Now, FIRE (Dec. 27, 2016),
https://www.thefire.org/free-speech-zones-then-and-now/ [https://perma.cc/Z2W7-DHSR].
187. See, e.g., Bayless v. Martine, 430 F.2d 873, 875, 878 (5th Cir. 1970) (determining that proximity
to classrooms made an open area a nonpublic forum rather than a traditional public forum).
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when it comes to conducting a First Amendment analysis in the
educational setting. Courts would no longer need to measure the size
of a sidewalk to determine if it was narrowly tailored to serve a
compelling government interest.188 They would no longer need to
assess the distance between a free speech area and main campus to
decide whether the speaker was too far away from his intended
audience.189 They would no longer need to consider whether and
what kinds of alternatives were available to a speaker.190
Likewise, just as Justice Kennedy warned that courts should
protect a “First Amendment interest of not burdening or penalizing
citizens because of their participation” in the voting process, speakers
should not be penalized simply because they seek to participate in the
speech process on campus.191 Refusing to uphold place restrictions
would eliminate the burden a speaker faces when she tries, but fails,
to reach her intended audience because they are geographically far
away.192 A speaker would then have a fair opportunity to actually
188. Univ. of Cincinnati Chapter of Young Ams. for Liberty v. Williams, No. 1:12-CV-155, 2012
WL 2160969, at *3 (S.D. Ohio June 12, 2012) (writing that “the Free Speech Area is a grassy open
space between slant walks measuring approximately 4,537 square feet on the University’s West Campus
. . . . It comprises approximately .01% of the entire campus”).
189. Roberts v. Haragan, 346 F. Supp. 2d 853, 864 (N.D. Tex. 2004) (finding that a school’s “request
that Plaintiff change the location of his speech by approximately twenty feet was a legitimate,
viewpoint-neutral, location consideration that was narrowly tailored to meet a significant University
concern”).
190. Pro-Life Cougars v. Univ. of Hous., 259 F. Supp. 2d 575, 578–79 (S.D. Tex. 2003) (weighing
plaintiffs’ concern that alternative locations for their speech were “too small . . . too far removed from
the part of campus where students congregate and . . . obscured from view by trees” against
administration’s assertion that the students’ speech was “potentially disruptive”) dismissed, 67 F. App’x
251 (5th Cir. 2003).
191. Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 314 (2004).
192. Students Against Apartheid Coal. v. O’Neil, 660 F. Supp. 333, 340 (W.D. Va. 1987). Students
protesting the University of Virginia’s investments in South Africa during the apartheid sought to erect
shanties on a campus lawn to illustrate life for black South Africans at the time. Id. at 335–37. This
location would ensure that members of the university board would see the protestors during their
quarterly meetings, but the university created a policy prohibiting “any structure or extended presence”
on the lawn. Id. at 336–37. The district court held that, although the university had authority to regulate
the time, place, and manner of speech, it failed to show how its restrictions on speech were the least
restrictive means to promote “esthetic integrity” on campus. Id. at 339. Furthermore, the alternative
modes of communication available to the student protest would impose “more cost and less autonomy
than the shanties, [and were] less likely to reach the Board of Visitors who may not deliberately be
seeking information about apartheid.” Id. at 340. After the university revised its policy to eliminate the
phrase “extended presence,” the district court found for the university, reasoning that the policy became
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convey her message, rather than be gerrymandered to a corner of
campus where her expression is rendered silent and, as a result,
ineffective.193
Most importantly, abolishing the place test would narrow the
number of approaches a court must consider when it comes to forum
and scrutiny analyses, vastly simplifying the complex jurisprudence
that has developed in the past fifty years. Typically, the traditional
and designated public forum analyses require that a court ask whether
a speech zone was reasonable as to its location, whether there were
ample alternatives available for speech, and whether relegating
speech to a certain location served a significant state interest.194
Because forgoing the place test would mean that courts would no
longer consider whether the location of a zone is reasonable, courts
would also no longer need to ask whether ample alternatives were
available to a speaker in lieu of the location in which he wished to
speak.195 Instead, courts would only need to determine whether the
zones served a significant government interest.196 This would
effectively remove the complex exceptions to strict scrutiny in the
educational field and allow courts to revert back to strict scrutiny in
its purest form, where a government entity must show that it has a
compelling interest to limit speech and uses the least restrictive
means to do so.197
Furthermore, because the lower standard of scrutiny traditionally
applied to speech zones in nonpublic forums simply asks whether a
place restriction on speech is reasonable, the elimination of the place

a content-neutral restriction that was narrowly tailored to preserve “esthetic integrity.” Students Against
Apartheid Coal. v. O’Neil, 671 F. Supp. 1105, 1107 (W.D. Va. 1987), aff’d, 838 F.2d 735 (4th Cir.
1988).
193. Students Against Apartheid Coal., 660 F. Supp. at 340 (finding that alternative modes of
communication, such as sending out letters of protest, “might be less effective for delivering the
message that is conveyed by the sight of a shanty in front of the Rotunda”).
194. See, e.g., Bloedorn v. Grube, 631 F.3d 1218, 1231 (11th Cir. 2011).
195. See Zick, supra note 161, at 499 (writing that the problem with the time, place, and manner “lies
in interpreting and actually applying” standards such as narrow tailoring and ample alternatives, “and
doing so with respect to places”).
196. Bloedorn, 631 F.3d at 1231.
197. See supra Part II.
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analysis would mean that courts would no longer consider the
reasonableness of a place restriction in any context. Therefore, courts
would have to presume that free speech zones are unreasonable,
essentially elevating the standard of constitutional review for all
zones to that of strict scrutiny, no matter the forum.198 A university
would thus need to overcome the difficult hurdle of showing that a
speech zone serves a compelling state interest and that the regulation
is narrowly tailored to achieve that interest.199
Finally, every forum analysis essentially is a place analysis.200
Currently, for each free speech lawsuit, a court must consider the
forum in which a speech zone was located to determine whether the
university’s speech regulation was constitutional.201 This
interdependence would disappear with the application of strict
scrutiny and the removal of place tests. Because the speech zone
itself would be presumptively unconstitutional, courts would not
need to ask which forum housed the zone. By extension, courts
would not need to consider the history of a university—whether
campus spaces have traditionally been public or private—to
determine whether a certain quad is a traditional, designated, or
nonpublic forum.202 They would likewise not need to conduct a
somewhat subjective analysis to determine if the university
intentionally designated space for speech or if it was unintentionally
done.203 Removing the place test, and thus the forum analysis, would
198. See Langhauser, supra note 7, at 501.
199. See, e.g., Univ. of Cincinnati Chapter of Young Ams. for Liberty v. Williams, No. 1:12-CV-155,
2012 WL 2160969, at *7 (S.D. Ohio June 12, 2012) (finding that a university policy was not narrowly
tailored when it “paints with a broad brush to encompass all speech that may be classified as a
‘demonstration, picket, or rally’”).
200. See, e.g., Langhauser, supra note 7, at 496 (describing how a court’s definition of a forum
depends on its location and context).
201. Id. at 497. “Once the precise scope of the forum has been identified, counsel should then
determine whether that forum is public or non-public.” Id.
202. Bowman v. White, 444 F.3d 967, 978 (8th Cir. 2006) (finding that when conducting a forum
analysis “[w]e must also examine the traditional use of the property, the objective use and purposes of
the space, and the government intent and policy with respect to the property . . . we must acknowledge
the presence of any special characteristics regarding the environment in which those areas exist”).
203. Compare id., with Zick, supra note 161, at 449 (“The intent to create a ‘designated’ public forum
must be clearly manifested. The ‘objective’ indicators of this intent include such things as ‘the policy
and practice of the government’ and the ‘nature of the property and its compatibility with expressive
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elevate the scrutiny analysis, enabling courts to more closely examine
the nature of the restriction as content-based or content-neutral.204
Despite this change, universities would still be able to maintain a
safe and secure learning environment. First, universities should not
be limited in their power to designate areas on campus for various
uses other than speech. This may include opening walkways or
performing arts centers to the public while reserving classroom space
for students.205 In that way, universities can always maintain a
“variety of fora” on their grounds.206 However, courts should avoid
examining the forum in which speech occurs for purposes of First
Amendment litigation, as doing so would perpetuate the form of
expressive gerrymandering that has taken place on college
campuses.207
Instead, courts should continue to permit universities to regulate
the time and manner of speech to maintain a secure environment,
subject to the reasonableness standard traditionally used to evaluate
such measures. For instance, a university should not prohibit speech
from occurring inside of a classroom. Rather, it may still reasonably

activity.’”).
204. See supra Part II.
205. See Langhauser, supra note 7, at 497, 505.
206. Bloedorn v. Grube, 631 F.3d 1218, 1232 (11th Cir. 2011).
207. After removing the place exception, courts will still apply strict scrutiny, allowing universities to
demonstrate how it would serve a compelling government interest to reserve certain spaces for certain
speakers. For instance, barring strangers from attending class serves an academic value at the very
essence of the university’s mission—teaching enrolled students—and it serves a compelling interest in
security. An alternative option that universities may be able to exercise would be trespass laws;
universities may deter members of the public from taking advantage of areas reserved for students. See
Gilles v. Blanchard, 477 F.3d 466, 469–70 (7th Cir. 2007). In Gilles v. Blanchard, Judge Posner wrote
of a preacher wishing to access a university lawn:
Public property is property, and the law of trespass protects public property, as it protects private
property, from uninvited guests.
. . . [A] university that decided to permit its open spaces to be used by some
outsiders could not exclude others just because it disapproved of their message.
But it could use neutral criteria for access, such as that an outsider must be
invited to speak on campus by a faculty member or a student group. The
difference between invited and uninvited visitors is fundamental to a system of
property rights.
Id. at 470 (internal citations omitted).
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prohibit methods of speech that are disruptive during class.208
Similarly, a university should not prevent protests from happening on
its front lawn. Instead, a university could forbid any speech on
campus that incites others to violence.209 Finally, a university should
not forbid students from engaging in expression in dormitories.
Instead, a university could refuse to allow disruptive speech to occur
between the hours of 11 p.m. and 7 a.m.210 These examples
demonstrate how a university may still restrict the time and manner
of speech to lessen its potentially dangerous effects without refusing
a platform to speakers altogether by dispersing forums across
campus.
Time and manner restrictions on speech seem to be more
discernibly content-based or content-neutral.211 A school’s attempts
to restrict the content of speech through time and manner regulations
will likely be more obvious to a court. For instance, a university
would probably not prohibit speech from occurring between the
hours of 9 a.m. and 5 p.m. because those are normal business and
class hours; any attempts to prohibit a specific group from speaking
during that time would be presumptively unconstitutional because it
suggests that the university wants that particular group out of sight
until after hours.212 When it comes to the manner of speech, a blanket
prohibition on protests would likely be too broad, as a protest can
take many forms including silent sit-ins, wearing black armbands,
208. See Langhauser, supra note 7, at 497.
209. See RICH, supra note 6, at § 5.1 (quoting Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571–72
(1942)).
210. Fox v. Bd. of Trs. of State Univ. of N. Y., 841 F.2d 1207, 1211 (2d Cir. 1988) (finding that
students have a “right to receive information” in their dormitories).
211. See Bloedorn, 631 F.3d at 1237 (finding a university policy reasonable as to its time restriction
without conducting a forum analysis because it was a university’s “undisputed practice to issue a permit
for a speaker’s requested date and time so long as the space [had] not already been reserved by another
speaker or group.”); see also Roberts v. Haragan, 346 F. Supp. 2d 853, 857 (N.D. Tex. 2004) (finding
that a university’s restriction “did not deny [p]laintiff permission to speak at the time or in the manner
he chose, but only in the location he had requested”).
212. See, e.g., Students Against Apartheid Coal. v. O’Neil, 660 F. Supp. 333, 337 (W.D. Va. 1987).
Students intended to erect shanties in a way that would be visible to the school board “from the time
their quarterly meetings [were] scheduled to begin until the time of their final adjournment.” Id. The
court found that the university’s policy prohibiting students from building shanties on the quad
unreasonably restricted the time, place, and manner of speech. Id. at 336, 340.
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and even quietly distributing pocket Constitutions on a public
sidewalk.213 The overbreadth of a ban against all protests would
demonstrate more clearly that a university views protest itself to be
too controversial. A court would likely find this unconstitutional
given that protest is traditionally protected so long as speakers do not
incite listeners to violence.214 More obviously, a ban on all political
speech on campus would certainly be unconstitutional, as that would
be a restriction based on the nature and content of the speech.215
Thus, courts can more clearly observe and strike down time and
manner restrictions that inhibit speech based on its content in a way
that has not been so clear when it comes to place restrictions.
B. The Place Analysis in the Context of the Fourteenth
Amendment
If courts eliminate a place analysis and begin treating speech zones
as presumptively unconstitutional, more students will be able to
access and participate in discourse on campus. This is important
because open dialogue allows parties to engage in free inquiry in
accordance with every university’s academic mission.216 Although
schools typically do not regulate speech based on a speaker’s
213. HUDSON, supra note 131, § 2:2. Hudson writes:
A content-neutral law could prohibit even more speech than a content-based law.
If a city passes a law that prohibits all billboards or signs within its jurisdiction,
that law prohibits more speech than a law that selectively prohibits political
billboards . . . the fear is that the government might distort the marketplace and
favor certain ideas over others. The Supreme Court still looks very closely at any
law that prohibits an entire medium of communication.
Id.
214. RICH, supra note 33, § 5:1.
215. See, e.g., id. § 5:5. When referring to a recent Supreme Court case regarding a content-based
regulation on speech, Rich notes:
All nine justices agreed that a city sign regulation that regulated 23 categories of
signs, distinguishing, for example among ‘temporary directional signs,’ ‘political
signs,’ and ‘ideological signs,’ was content based and could not survive strict
scrutiny. The fact that the restriction did not distinguish within categories based
upon the viewpoint of speakers did not result in a lower level of scrutiny.
Id.
216. See Coll. Republicans at S.F. State Univ. v. Reed, 523 F. Supp. 2d 1005, 1016 (N.D. Cal. 2007)
(quoting Doe v. Univ. of Mich., 721 F. Supp. 852, 863 (E.D. Mich. 1989) (citing Keyishian v. Bd. of
Regents of Univ. of State of N.Y., 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967))).
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viewpoint, they often cast out speakers based on the nature of their
speech, particularly if it may be controversial.217 This presents a
Fourteenth Amendment issue, as universities have implicitly treated
silence more favorably than potentially contentious speech.218
Eliminating the place prong of the time, place, or manner test will not
necessarily solve this problem immediately, but it is a step in the
direction away from the content-based restrictions that often go
unnoticed in the form of speech zones.219
Finally, just as a dilution of votes creates an equal protection
concern by favoring a group of voters on the basis of their ideology
while isolating other voters, the division of campus by favoring
certain viewpoints while silencing others will necessarily come to an
end if courts treat place restrictions as presumptively
unconstitutional.220 Speech zones have diluted and dispersed speakers
too thinly across campus, often so that universities can protect certain
students from being offended.221 Elevating silence over speech for
the sake of political correctness, as well as burdening speakers so that
their messages go unheard, violates both the Equal Protection Clause
and the Free Speech Clause.222 Although free speech zones have
these effects, many courts still recognize the zones as reasonable
restrictions on speech. Courts must cease granting the zones
legitimacy, and instead should begin treating place restrictions as
presumptively unconstitutional.

217. See Pro-Life Cougars v. Univ. of Houston, 259 F. Supp. 2d 575, 585 (S.D. Tex.
2003), dismissed, 67 F. App’x 251 (5th Cir. 2003); see also Roberts v. Haragan, 346 F. Supp. 2d 853,
872 (N.D. Tex. 2004).
218. See supra Part II.
219. Herrold, supra note 17, at 953–54.
220. See HUDSON, supra note 131, § 2:2.
221. Id.
222. See supra Part II.
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CONCLUSION
For fifty years, universities have gerrymandered speech to corners,
sidewalks, and gazebos in the name of student safety.223 However, it
seems as though colleges have conflated physical safety with
emotional safety, attempting to shield students from potentially
offensive or controversial speech.224 Though civility is admirable, it
is not always constitutional; the implementation of free speech zones
in the name of political correctness violates students’ First and
Fourteenth Amendment interests in participating in the speech
process. Yet, when students contest the speech zones in court, the
outcomes vary according to each court’s assessment of the forum in
which the speech took place.225 In that way, freedom of speech has
become too dependent on the location in which it occurs, preventing
courts from striking down regulations that are largely discriminatory.
Courts must revert to traditional standards of scrutiny by refusing to
accept place restrictions on speech. In doing so, the burden on
speakers and courts alike will be lifted, as students will no longer feel
deterred from speaking and courts will no longer need to weigh the
complex factors involved in current forum analyses.

223. Supra Part I.
224. Supra Part I.
225. Supra Part II.
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